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This study develops a detailed description of the successful technology transfer of an 
invention—the drug-eluting coronary stent—originating in intramural research within the 
National Institutes of Health.  The history of the commercialization of the invention is used 
to illustrate a new policy, proposed and explained in this study, for the payment to the 
government of royalties on the sales of biomedical products developed with substantial 
public funding provided through indirect as well as direct funding avenues.  The proposed 
policy addresses concerns about the high prices that taxpayers as consumers pay for 
biomedical products that were developed with funding from the taxpayers as investors.  
The study explains the theoretical circumstances in which the policy would not adversely 
affect the appropriate level of R&D investment, and then uses the history of the drug-
eluting coronary stent as an example where biomedical R&D is consistent with those 
circumstances.   
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1.  A Practical Problem for Publicly-Financed Biomedical Research 
Society benefits from the technology transfer of inventions created by the publicly 
financed and publicly performed research and development (R&D) within the laboratories 
of U.S. federal agencies.1  This study describes in detail an important example—the 
technology transfer of the invention of the drug-eluting coronary stent within the 
laboratories of the National Institute of Aging (NIA) within the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH).  Society also benefits from the biomedical innovations developed by 
industry that do not originate with inventions in federal laboratories but nonetheless receive 
substantial support from public funding for the R&D investment.  The example of 
Remdesivir, developed by the pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences and used as a 
treatment for Covid-19, is used to illustrate the case where the invention occurs in industry 
yet receives substantial public-sector funding to support the R&D that results in the 
innovation.   
The examples of the drug-eluting coronary stent and the Covid-19 treatment were 
chosen not only because one illustrates the technology transfer of a federal laboratory 
invention while the other illustrates industrial R&D supported by publicly funded research, 
but because they both provide good illustrations of the two avenues—one direct and one 
indirect—through which the public funds biomedical research.  In this study, we propose a 
new policy to address a practical problem, and the policy that we propose is grounded in 
those two avenues for public funding. 
The practical problem that we address remains despite the clear benefits from the 
technology transfer of inventions from publicly funded and performed research and from 
public funding that supports industrial R&D.  The practical problem is that taxpayers play 
the role of investors in the R&D that generates the inventions, but then in their role as 
consumers of the commercialized technologies are sometimes perceived as paying 
“unreasonable prices” for the very innovations that they in substantial part financed.  We 
propose a new policy of royalties that would address and mitigate the practical problem, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Link and Scott (2019) provide a review of U.S. public policy toward technology transfers from U.S. federal 
laboratories and describe the social economic benefits—the sum of consumer and producer surplus—
generated when private firms commercialize technologies invented in federal laboratories. 
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and we illustrate the policy using our detailed description for the technology transfer of the 
drug-eluting stent.    
The practical problem is manifest with pharmaceuticals and medical treatments and 
devices, figuring prominently in public debate and legislative initiatives.  The practical 
problem will not go away by simply explaining that society as a whole has benefited, with 
the social economic benefit from producer and consumer surplus generated by the 
commercialization of the invention exceeding the publicly financed R&D costs and the 
further development costs in the private sector.  The distribution of the economic surplus is 
key to resolving the practical problem.  To address the practical problem, various forms of 
price controls for pharmaceutical and other biomedical innovations have been proposed.  
The new policy of royalties that we propose in this study could be either an alternative to 
price controls, or because of the information that would be generated that would be useful 
in price negotiations, the royalties policy could be a complement to policies aimed at 
prices.2  
 
1.2.  Alternative Solutions for the Practical Problem 
Since the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, the U.S. Congress has debated and 
proposed legislation to authorize the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to negotiate the prices paid for prescription drugs purchased 
through Medicare Part D.  Such negotiation is currently prohibited by the Act.  In 2019 
alone, legislators proposed to Congress five different pieces of legislation to authorize the 
negotiation.3  Complaints about the high prices of pharmaceutical products have been 
prominent in public debate since as early as the late 1950s.4  Opponents of any sort of 
government control of prices express concerns that incentives for R&D would be lessened, 
resulting in less R&D and consequently less innovation.  Thoughtful proposals have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Danziger and Scott (forthcoming) provides a concise presentation of the proposed royalty proposal and 
refers the reader to this study for the underlying historical details for the story of the invention and successful 
technology transfer of the drug-eluting coronary stent, and also for the description and analysis of the rivalry 
among the entrants to the market as competing drug-eluting coronary stents were developed.  
3 Cubanski, et al. (2019) describe the five proposals, the analyses of the Congressional Budget Office about 
the effectiveness of government price negotiations, and the various sources of leverage that the government 
would have when negotiating lower pharmaceutical prices. 
4 Scherer (2010, p. 562) observes: “Beginning already in the late 1950s, the drug makers were accused in 
public fora of profiteering at the expense of consumers.  They argued in return that high profits were a reward 
for superior innovation and a necessary spur to investment in risky R&D.” 
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formulated policies that aim to balance the need for lower prescription drug prices and yet 
preserve incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.5  The proposals are necessarily quite 
complicated, and the concerns about the adverse effects on incentives for innovation 
remain.   
In this study, we propose an alternative, and complementary, approach to address 
the practical problem—a problem of the distribution of the economic surplus created by 
innovations—of the high prices taxpayers pay for the pharmaceutical products, and for 
biomedical products more generally, that their tax dollars supported with publicly financed 
R&D funds.  Seen as an alternative policy, rather than have the government negotiate the 
prices paid for biomedical products in the post-innovation market and create uncertainty 
about the resulting price reductions, we propose a new policy to pay, as a narrowly 
financial return on the taxpayers’ investments, royalties from the sales of those products 
that are developed with substantial public funding.  The taxpayers’ investments generate 
broad social economic returns, and the narrowly financial return from the royalties would 
serve to address the distribution of the economic surplus.  In practice, as discussed 
subsequently, post-innovation oligopolistic rivalry among substitutable products is 
anticipated.  In such circumstances, or even when there was more market power in the post-
innovation market, the pass-through of royalties to higher prices would be incomplete and 
economic surplus would be redistributed to taxpayers.  Given the redistribution of 
economic surplus, the effective prices would be lower.  However, the proposed royalties 
policy could be used as a complement to a policy of government negotiated prices, because 
the royalties policy would generate information (about the history of public support for a 
biomedical innovation) useful for price negotiations, and because the price negotiation 
policy could offset any pass through of royalties to prices.   
We identify two distinct avenues through which public funds are provided to 
support pharmaceutical and other biomedical innovations, and the royalties that we propose 
are not only for products developed with direct public funding delivered through the first 
funding avenue, but also for products receiving indirect public funding delivered through 
the second avenue.  To address the concerns about adverse effects on the incentives for 
biomedical innovation, we examine the economic theory about R&D investment and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See George Mason University (2019) and Frank and Nichols (2019).  
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identify the circumstances for which our proposal would not have such adverse effects.  We 
make the argument that those circumstances are likely to obtain for most biomedical R&D. 
For our primary example, we use the invention of drug-eluting stents in the research 
laboratories at NIA and the successful transfer of the technology—as commercialized for 
use in interventional cardiology in the worldwide coronary stent market—to illustrate an 
important biomedical innovation that was supported with public funds delivered through 
both of the avenues for public funding for biomedical R&D.  We also use the example to 
illustrate the dual role of the taxpayers as investors in R&D and users of its commercialized 
results, and to illustrate the circumstances for which the proposed government royalties 
would not be expected to have an adverse effect on biomedical innovation.  Finally, we use 
the details for the history of the technology transfer of the drug-eluting stent to illustrate the 
proposed royalties policy. 
  
1.3.  An Overview of the Sections 
Section 2 describes the two avenues through which biomedical R&D is publicly 
funded.  The two avenues deliver public funding for biomedical research (basic 
investigation, “academic” research predominantly done outside of industry) and R&D 
(predominantly done in industry).  Although the more basic research investigations are 
largely done in academic and federal laboratory settings, and the more applied 
developmental R&D work largely done in industry, there is developmental R&D in the 
academic and federal laboratory settings, and there is basic investigation in industry.  
Moreover, there is considerable feedback from more applied to more basic research.  We 
shall refer to the range from more basic research to the more applied research and 
development simply as R&D. 
Section 3 describes the history of the drug-eluting stents.  The history is the context 
for our primary example of the two avenues for public funding of biomedical R&D and the 
dual role of taxpayers as investors and consumers.  
Section 4 addresses the concerns that a policy of new royalty payments to the 
government would significantly reduce biomedical companies’ incentives to invest in R&D 
and consequently reduce biomedical innovation.  We explain the circumstances for which 
the policy would cause the R&D to be closer to the social optimum despite the fact that the 
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taxpayers would receive royalties from the sales of the innovations substantially financed 
with public funds.   
In Section 5, we begin by observing that the special circumstances—for which 
biomedical R&D may reasonably approximate the socially optimal amount even though the 
R&D-investing firms do not appropriate all of the returns from the investments—align with 
a prominent view of pharmaceutical R&D that has been published by one of the world’s 
leading scholars of innovation.  We then use the example of the NIA/NIH drug-eluting 
stent (DES) to explain that the necessary circumstances arguably obtained for that case of a 
product invented and developed with substantial public funding through both of the two 
avenues for delivering public funding for biomedical R&D.  We conclude that the DES 
case supports the argument that most biomedical innovation would be characterized by the 
circumstances for which the policy of government royalties would not have an adverse 
effect on innovation.   
Section 6 describes our proposal for government royalties for biomedical products 
that have received significant public support for their R&D.  The proposal is designed to 
address (1) the concerns about taxpayers who in their role as investors have supported the 
development of biomedical innovations yet then must pay what are perceived as 
unreasonable prices for those products, and (2) the concerns about biomedical companies’ 
incentives to perform R&D.  The proposal is compared with proposals that have 
emphasized government control of pharmaceutical prices.   
Section 7 concludes by summarizing the main points developed in this study. 
 
2. The Two Avenues for Public Funding of Pharmaceutical and Other Biomedical 
R&D 
 
2.1.  The First Avenue of Public Funding 
We identify two distinct avenues through which public funds are provided to 
support biomedical innovations.   
The first avenue delivers funds for research directly.  The direct funding is almost 
entirely publicly funded “academic” research, although some of the direct funding goes for 
research outside of universities or federal laboratories, including some research performed 
by biomedical companies.  In the case of the drug Remdesivir that has been much in the 
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news during the COVID-19 pandemic, this first avenue is illustrated by the funding of 
scientists, such as Dr. Mark R. Denison at Vanderbilt University, who have done research 
in academia that provided knowledge that underlies Remdesivir’s application as a treatment 
for COVID-19.6  Dr. Denison received NIH National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID) funding totaling $9,480,213 for his studies of coronavirus in a series of 
41 projects spanning the years from 1989 through 2014.  Five projects over the years 1997 
through 2001 studied “Coronavirus 3CL Proteinase Function in Virus Replication,”7 26 
projects over the years 1989 through 2014 studied “Coronavirus—Analysis of Polymerase 
Gene Products,”8 and 10 projects over the years 2003 through 2014 studied “The Cell 
Biology of Coronavirus Infection.”9 
The research of the academic scientists is directly supported with publicly funded 
grants administered by NIH or other federal agencies.  In addition to their extramural 
programs, the federal agencies carry out intramural research in their laboratories—within 
HHS, NIH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), for prominent 
examples, but other agencies also sponsor some biomedical research.  NIAID sponsored 
the recent clinical trial of Remdesivir as the FDA moved quickly to approve the drug for 
emergency use during the pandemic.10   
Although the research environments and the treatment of intellectual property do 
differ, when viewed broadly, both the extramural research in universities and the intramural 
research within federal agencies’ laboratories share a nonprofit, academic character. Also, 
both the NIH programs and those in universities are becoming more entrepreneurial and 
focused on developing intellectual property (IP).11  Research in both academia and industry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






10 Kolata (2020). 
11 For examples of academia becoming more entrepreneurial, see Stinchcomb (2010) and Mullard (2020). 
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requires regulation and oversight.12  Yet, it is difficult to compare such regulatory oversight 
because transparency is less in the for-profit setting for the R&D in biomedical companies. 
Although pharmaceutical R&D and the R&D for biomedical products more 
generally, such as medical devices like drug-eluting coronary stents, are for the most part 
financed from gross profits on the sales of the products, biotechnology firms use venture 
capital and private equity to finance their R&D.  Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs support private sector 
projects that in some cases result in pharmaceutical/medical products, and thus these 
products receive direct funding by the U.S. federal agencies.13  Thus, although not the same 
mechanism for delivering the public funding, the federal agencies’ SBIR and STTR 
programs, especially those of NIH, deliver public funds for biomedical R&D by for-profit 
companies.  Those programs are like the academic, university funding in their direct grants, 
but they are like the private sector R&D in terms of the for-profit research environment in 
the case of SBIR, and have the for-profit research environment of the small business joined 
with the research environment of the sponsoring agency’s laboratory in the case of a STTR 
project.14 
 
2.2.  The Second Avenue of Public Funding   
The pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences developed and patented the molecule 
GS-5734, known as Remdesivir.  For the second avenue of public funding for 
pharmaceutical research, there is the indirect funding of for-profit companies’ research.  
Public funding is provided in the sense that a pharmaceutical company’s development of a 
drug like Gilead Science’s Remdesivir is indirectly supported with public funds because 
the government, through Medicare and Medicaid, the VA, and the Affordable Care Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For clinical trials, both require institutional review board (IRB) approval (https://www.fda.gov/about-
fda/center-drug-evaluation-and-research-cder/institutional-review-boards-irbs-and-protection-human-
subjects-clinical-trials). 
13 See https://sbir.nih.gov/about/what-is-sbir-sttr, https://www.sbir.gov/about, and Link and Scott (2018).   
14 In addition to the federal funds supporting their R&D, the small businesses get outside R&D funding from 
many other sources.  For example, for SBIR projects over the years from 1992 through 2001, for a sample of 
388 NIH projects, U.S. private venture capital funding averaged 1.34 percent of the total R&D investment 
funding, with foreign private funding adding on average 0.62 percent of the total funding, and with other 
private equity funding adding on average 2.31 percent of the total funding.  There were many other sources of 
funding as well, and the information about all of those sources for the NIH sample as well as for the other 
agencies’ SBIR projects is provided in Link and Scott (2010, Table 4, p. 595). 
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(ACA), purchases drugs.  A portion of the pharmaceutical sales revenues from those 
purchases provides internally generated funds to support the pharmaceutical industry’s 
R&D investment in new drugs.  
The GS-5734 story provides a clear example where both avenues for funding are 
seen with the development of one drug, Remdesivir.  The story also provides a clear 
example of the different circumstances and constraints faced by the participants in each 
avenue’s work.  In the two avenues for public funding in support of biomedical research, 
academic researchers and pharmaceutical/medical industry researchers face very different 
circumstances and constraints.  Unlike directly federally funded research that is largely 
driven by peer review, the Freedom of Information Act, and publications, biomedical 
industry R&D is driven primarily by competitive forces, intellectual property, and 
commercial value.  Research funded in the U.S. through NIH and other funding agencies is 
highly regulated, underwritten only after national peer review via NIH study sessions.  In 
contrast, although the regulatory constraints on commercializing new drugs are well 
known, the biomedical industry R&D that develops a product to the point of being ready to 
address the regulatory hurdle for introducing it is not regulated, not subject to the Freedom 
of Information Act, and directed and designed without external or peer review. Unlike 
NIH-funded and university-based research, which is publication driven and with 
investigators who are evaluated by their productivity in papers written, 
pharmaceutical/medical companies do not have to report their research or findings and 
frequently do not. Furthermore, the criteria for NIH support and academic research grants 
are delineated clearly, yet there are no such criteria for the indirect funding of biomedical 
industry R&D through the purchases of pharmaceutical/medical products.  The different 
circumstances and constraints just described may play a role in why we find a company 
like Gilead Sciences with a shelf full of unused, but potentially useful molecules like GS-
5734, patented well before their usefulness has been established.15  
In sum, the story of Gilead Science’s Remdesivir illustrates the two distinct funding 
avenues in one drug development.  The story illustrates the different treatment and 
constraints of drug development in the two avenues.  It illustrates the resulting for-profit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Kolata (2020) for discussion of the selection of Remdesivir by Dr. Denison from Gilead Sciences’ 
inventory of unused drugs. 
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patenting of potentially useful drugs at a very early stage in the development process.  In 
the context of concern about the pricing of Remdesivir when used as a treatment for Covid-
19, the story illustrates concerns about asymmetric treatment of the taxpayers as investors 
in the development of the drug versus the treatment of the drug company’s investors.  The 
taxpayers have the unfortunate role of being investors for whom successful innovation 
brings the reward of paying high prices as consumers of the innovation. 
Similarly, there has been a massive effort to develop a vaccine against Covid19;  
Mullard (2020) provides an excellent description and discussion.  In an effort to shorten the 
normal timeline, which can be years, at least ten different entities, including pharmaceutical 
companies, universities, institutes, biotech, and consortiums between these, have competed 
to develop an effective vaccine.  In fact, the World Health Organization (WHO) counted 
over 100 candidates under consideration, although subsequently just a handful remain. 
Assuming the typical success rate for vaccine development is 6%, it is a very competitive 
field with few winners anticipated, although the prospects are better for vaccines developed 
in response to the pandemic.16  Resources for vaccine development are coming from many 
sources.17  Who will bear the cost of the required large clinical trials is yet to be 
determined, and pricing too is yet to be determined.18  
The complete stories for Remdesivir and for the COVID-19 vaccine are still 
evolving.  In Section 3, we turn to an example of a biomedical product, the paclitaxel-
eluting coronary stent, that received significant public funding through both of the avenues 
for delivering public funding to support biomedical R&D, and for which we can also 
observe its commercialization history over the lifetime of its USPTO patents.  First, before 
presenting the history of the paclitaxel-eluting stent, we describe the sizes of the two 
funding avenues.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Pronker,	  et.	  al.	  (2013,	  p.	  1)	  report:	  “The	  average	  vaccine,	  taken	  from	  the	  preclinical	  phase,	  requires	  a	  
development	  timeline	  of	  10.71	  years	  and	  has	  a	  market	  entry	  probability	  of	  6%.	  	  Stratification	  by	  
disease	  area	  reveals	  pandemic	  influenza	  vaccine	  targets	  as	  lucrative.	  	  Furthermore,	  vaccines	  targeting	  
acute	  infectious	  diseases	  and	  prophylactic	  vaccines	  have	  shown	  to	  have	  a	  lower	  risk	  profile	  when	  
compared	  to	  vaccines	  targeting	  chronic	  infections	  and	  therapeutic	  applications.”	  
17 See Mullard (2020). 
18 In June 2020, the 116th U.S. Congress, 2nd Session, was preparing a bill, the Coronavirus Preparedness and 
Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020, that among several other large appropriations to respond 
to the coronavirus pandemic would provide $3.1 billion that, among other uses, could be used for 
development and manufacturing of vaccines and for their purchase (at “fair and reasonable pricing” 
“affordable in the commercial market”) by the government. 
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2.3.  The Sizes of the Two Avenues of Public Funding   
To provide a rough estimate of the sizes of the two avenues for delivering public 
funds to support pharmaceutical and other biomedical R&D, we use two sources.  One is 
the National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA), from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.  The NHEA data are the official estimates of total health care spending 
in the United States.19 The other source is the BRDIS data.  “The Business Research and 
Development and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) is the primary source of information on 
domestic and global research and development expenditures and the R&D workforce for 
companies operating in the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.  The survey is 
conducted annually by the U.S. Census Bureau in accordance with an interagency 
agreement with the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES) within 
the National Science Foundation (NSF).”20    
From the NHEA, we use the National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and 
Source of Funds: Calendar Years 1960 to 2018, and the data therein for 2018.  From these 
data we use two expenditure items. 
First, we use the item for health research expenditures (in millions) for 2018.  The 
federal government spent $39,504 million for health research in 2018.  The number that we 
use for our estimate of the size of the direct public funding avenue is then $39.5 billion.  
That amount is publicly funded direct support for pharmaceutical and medical research 
from the U.S. federal government; it is the research support provided through the avenue of 
direct funding.   
Second, for the size of the indirect funding avenue, we use a statistic that is just a 
subset of the federal government’s healthcare expenditures that would be included in the 
indirect avenue for delivering publicly financed R&D funds to the pharmaceutical and 
medical products industry.  The amount we use is for one category of the government’s 
healthcare expenditures, but it includes the majority of those expenditures that would go 
into the indirect R&D funding avenue.  The category is “Total Prescription Drug 
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Expenditures” in millions of dollars for the year 2018.  From that category, we sum the 
expenditures for Medicare ($107,248 million), Federal Medicaid ($21,339 million), Federal 
Children’s Health Insurance Program, CHIP ($1,883 million), Department of Defense 
(DoD) ($4,983 million), and the VA ($4,344 million).  The sum of these expenditures for 
2018 is $139.80 billion.  We multiply this sum of expenditures by the R&D to sales ratio 
for pharmaceutical and medical companies that would be the sellers of the pharmaceutical 
and medical products purchased by the government.  To get the R&D to sales ratio, we turn 
to the BRDIS data. 
Some companies perform R&D and also fund R&D that they contract out to other 
companies to perform; some companies do not perform R&D but fund R&D that they 
contract out to other firms, and some companies just perform R&D that they or other 
companies fund.  Among these companies, for some, especially the largest, the R&D to 
sales ratios exceed 20%.  For example, from an annual survey of members of PhRMA, an 
industry lobbying group, for 2017 the members’ R&D spending was 21.4% of the 
members’ total sales.21  However, the government’s purchases of pharmaceuticals will be 
dispersed over the more diverse set of firms, and so the R&D to sales ratio—that we 
multiply times the amount of the government purchases to have an estimate of the public’s 
indirect funding of R&D—is the R&D to net sales ratio for all of the U.S. pharmaceutical 
and medicines firms.  For the diverse group of firms, the R&D to net sales ratio (using just 
the company-financed R&D rather than all R&D, because a portion of company performed 
R&D is financed by the government) is 14.3 %.22  
The sum of government’s prescription drug expenditures for 2018 is $139.80 
billion, and that will be an underestimate of the federal government’s expenditures for 
pharmaceutical and medical products of which prescription drugs are a subset, so our 
estimate of the indirect funding of R&D will be conservative.  We multiply the 
government’s expenditures of $139.80 billion by the R&D to sales ratio of 0.143 for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Dunn (2018). 
22 From the BRDIS data, we use the “Detailed Statistical Tables,” NSF 19-318, May 13, 2019.  We use Table 
33, “Domestic R&D paid for by the company and performed by the company and others as a percentage of 
domestic net sales, by industry and company size: 2016.” For the industry “Pharmaceuticals and medicines” 
NAICS (2012 North American Industry Classification System) code 3254, U.S. domestic R&D as a percent 
of domestic sales of R&D performers or funders = 14.3%, where the statistics used for both the numerator 
and denominator in the calculation of the percentage are representative of companies located in the United 
States that performed or funded R&D. 
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pharmaceutical and medicines companies, and our conservative estimate for the size of the 
indirect public funding of pharmaceutical and medical R&D is $20.0 billion.  
Thus for the direct public funding of pharmaceutical and medical R&D avenue, we 
have $39.5 billion in direct support for R&D from the U.S. federal government.  For the 
indirect public funding of the pharmaceutical and medical companies’ R&D, we have the 
conservative underestimate of $20.0 billion.  The direct funding avenue is larger, but the 
two avenues for delivering taxpayers’ dollars to support R&D for pharmaceutical and 
medical products are of the same order of magnitude.   
 
 
3. The Story of Drug-Eluting Coronary Stents 
 
3.1.  The Invention of the Drug-Eluting Coronary Stent   
Our detailed example of a biomedical innovation that received significant public 
funding throughout its history is the story of the drug-eluting coronary stent that was 
invented in a research laboratory at NIA within NIH and subsequently commercialized for 
use in interventional cardiology in the worldwide coronary stent market.  The technology 
earned millions of dollars in royalties for the U.S. government.  Those royalties repaid 
many times over the public’s investment in the NIA research that created the invention, and 
more importantly, the technology, when successfully transferred as the commercialized 
Taxol (paclitaxel—Taxol is the brand name for the drug paclitaxel) coated coronary stents 
used in interventional cardiology, allowed millions of patients to avoid coronary artery 
bypass surgery. 
The NIH Record observed that 2005 was a banner year for NIH intramural 
researchers.  That year the NIH Office of Technology Transfer collected almost $100 
million in royalties from the patented and licensed inventions of the NIH intramural 
researchers.  The NIH Record reported: “Even better for medical research are the millions” 
who would be helped by the commercialization of the inventions.  The report touted the 
invention that was the top royalties earner for 2005.  It was the invention of the drug-
eluting stent by two NIA scientists, Dr. Steven Sollot and Dr. James Kinsella.  They had 
discovered that implanting coronary stents that were coated with the drug paclitaxel 
significantly reduced the re-clogging of arteries.  The NIH Record observed: “The 
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invention, which went on the U.S. market in 2004, has been a medical marvel for the more 
than half a million Americans each year who now can avoid heart bypass surgery by having 
the stent placed instead.”23 
Heart disease is the leading cause of death in America and coronary artery disease 
or narrowing, secondary to atherosclerosis, that reduces blood flow to the heart is the most 
common type of heart disease.24 However, the incidence of coronary artery disease related 
deaths has declined over the past 40 years.25  This has in large part been due to 
“mechanical” ways to treat narrowing of the coronary arteries. The first method used is a 
form of surgery, known as a coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), in which veins from the 
legs are used to bypass narrowings in the arteries and thereby increase blood flow to the 
heart.  This requires major surgery and has gradually been replaced in many cases by 
innovations in interventional cardiology, a field that utilizes the insertion of a catheter 
(usually through the femoral artery in the leg) into the coronary arteries and, for which, the 
Nobel Prize in Medicine or Physiology in 1956 was awarded to Werner Forssmann.  In 
1977, Andreas Gruentzig, a German radiologist, showed that you could reduce the 
narrowing in a coronary vessel by putting a “balloon” on the end of a catheter and inflating 
it, i.e., “balloon angioplasty” (Figure 1), thereby initiating the field of percutaneous 
coronary interventions or percutaneous coronary angioplasty  (PCI or PTCA).  However, 
initially these vessels frequently narrowed again, i.e., “re-stenosed.”  In a major milestone, 
expandable “bare metal stents” (BMS) were introduced in 1986. These self-expanding 
stents are placed on the PCI balloon and left in place (Figure 1). However, these arteries 
were found to frequently re-stenose as well and another innovative approach was clearly 
needed.   
 
Figure 1.  Coronary Artery Stents 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Garnett (2006). 
24 https://www.cdc.gov/heartdisease/facts.htm: Heart Disease. Edited by Control CfD2020. 
25 Dalen et al. (2014). 
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Schematic of steps in stenting a vessel:  Top drawing (step 1) depicts an artery with a stenosis (lighter areas 
along the insides of the artery’s wall adjacent the stent) into which an uninflated balloon catheter encircled by 
an undeployed stent has been inserted. The middle drawing  (step 2) depicts inflation of the balloon catheter 
for deployment of the stent.  The lower drawing (step 3) depicts a deployed stent after balloon catheter 
removal. Drug eluting stents (DES) contain drugs that are released to prevent restenosis. The spheres 
represent red blood cells. 
Source: iStock 
 
It was at this time, that the importance of the endothelium, or inner-most layer of 
cells in an artery, in preventing the proliferation of underlying vascular smooth muscle 
cells was realized. The endothelium releases nitric oxide, which diffuses into adjacent 
vascular smooth muscle cells and, by activating guanylyl cyclase, prevents the smooth 
muscle cells from proliferating and obstructing arteries. When there is atherosclerosis, the 
endothelium is damaged and the vascular smooth muscle cells proliferate and narrow the 
artery. For these discoveries, Robert F. Furchgott, Louis J. Ignarro, and Ferid Murad were 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1998.  With the commercialization 
in 2003-04 of their early-1990s invention, Steven Sollott and James Kinsela, at NIH, 
translated this knowledge into the treatment of coronary artery disease by coating a metal 
stent with paclitaxel, an anti-microtubule chemical agent. They reasoned that this would 
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prevent the vascular smooth muscle cells from proliferating and migrating into the 
coronary vessel until the endothelium could reform on the stent and prevent restenosis.  
The efficacy of this strategy in preventing in-stent restenosis was first reported in major 
randomized controlled clinical trials in 2003 for paclitaxel-eluting stents and followed by 
several other supporting studies.26  This was the birth of the drug eluting stent (DES).27  
Drug-eluting stents now have approximately 95% of the stent market and have 
evolved through multiple generations and improvements.  The first generation of DES 
began with the Taxol-coated (paclitaxel-coated) stent, introduced by the co-exclusive 
licensees of NIH’s exclusive licensee, Angiotech Pharmaceutical.  Thus, the 
commercialization of the NIH invention of the drug-eluting coronary stent began with its 
introduction by Angiotech’s co-exclusive licensees—first by Cook Inc. in Europe in late 
2002 followed by Boston Scientific in Europe in 2003 and then in the U.S. in 2004.  During 
the same period that Angiotech’s licensees introduced the paclitaxel-coated stents, Johnson 
& Johnson’s subsidiary Cordis Corporation introduced its sirolimus-coated coronary stent, 
Cypher, a stent which is coated with rapamycin (also known as sirolimus), an 
immunosuppressive agent that, like paclitaxel, also inhibits smooth muscle cell 
proliferation.  
The diffusion of the innovation continued when these first-generation drug-eluting 
stents were followed by a second generation of stents when it was realized that “late” stent 
thrombosis, i.e., over 30 days after placement, occurred with the original drug-eluting 
stents.28  The second generation of DES was defined by the use of different materials for 
the stent.  The stents continued to use a medical grade metal to provide structural support 
for the artery, but new biocompatible polymers were used to control the release of the 
eluted drug.  The eluted drugs for the second generation of stents included zotarolimus, 
everolimus, and novolimus.  Thus, the metal stent has a thin coating of the drug—for 
example, everolimus—that is gradually eluted, slowly released into the artery wall around 
the stent from a thin polymer (a type of plastic) coating.  The stent provides mechanical 
support to the artery while the everolimus is slowly released into the artery wall around the 
stent from a thin polymer coating that helps control the release of the drug.  The release of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Tomberli et al. (2018, Table 1, p. 315). 
27 Stefanini and Holmes (2013). 
28 Camenzind et al. (2007). 
	   18	  
the drug is intended to limit the overgrowth of tissue within the coronary stent—i.e. 
restenosis.29  These second-generation stents were shown to be associated with fewer heart 
attacks and in-stent thromboses (clotting). These have now become the most widely used 
coronary stents in the world.  
Thus, the paclitaxel-drug eluting coronary stent from Angiotech licensees Cook and 
Boston Scientific and the sirolimus-eluting stent from Johnson & Johnson subsidiary 
Cordis launched the first generation of drug-eluting coronary stents.  Over the decade after 
the launch, drug-eluting stents diffused and evolved rapidly, with a second generation of 
drug-eluting coronary stents with different metals for the stent platforms, different eluting 
drugs, and different polymers for the delivery and release of the drug “totally replacing … 
first-generation DES” (Tomberli, et al., 2018, p. 313). The second generation stents with 
durable polymers include Boston Scientific’s Promus Premiere stent, with major 
randomized clinical trial (RCT) in 2009; Abbott Vascular’s XIENCE family of stents, with 
major RCTs over the period from 2007-2011, and Medtronic’s Endeavor stent, with major 
RCT in 2009-2010 (Tomberli, et al., Table 1, pp. 315-316, and Table 2, p. 317).   
Efforts to improve upon these stents continue, with polymer-free drug eluting, 
biodegradable, and bioabsorbable stents. However, these stents build upon the concept of 
incorporating a drug or compound that prevents in-stent restenosis.  Currently available 
stents with biodegradable polymers include, among others, Boston Scientific’s SYNERGY 
stent and Biotronic’s Orsiro stent (Tomberli, et al. Table 2, p. 317).   
Stent market competition continues to increase through new products and 
innovation.  Industry analysts project the overall global stent market to grow to $11.3 
billion in 2027, expanding at compound annual growth rate of 4.7%.30  However, as the 
treatment of coronary artery disease has evolved, medical management with drugs, such as 
statins that treat lipid abnormalities and anti-hypertensive agents, along with diet and 
lifestyle modifications have also taken on a greater role. Importantly, the results of 
numerous clinical trials have helped to narrow the clinical indications for stents (versus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For the discussion here, see Boston Scientific, PROMUS® Everolimus-Eluting Coronary Stent System: 
Patient Information Guide https://www.bostonscientific.com/content/dam/Manuals/us/current-rev-
en/EL2077745_Promus_patgde_us_S.pdf; also see Fornell (2019). 
30 https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/coronary-stents-industry. 
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medical management alone and/or coronary artery bypass surgery).  These may cause 
growth to be in more focused areas. 
 
3.2.  NIH Finds an Ideal Exclusive Licensee for the Technology Transfer of the Drug-
Eluting Coronary Stent   
Table 1 provides an overview of key events in the technology transfer story for the 
paclitaxel-eluting coronary stents.  Accomplishing the successful technology transfer for an 
invention resulting from the research in a federal agency’s laboratory is often a difficult 
and lengthy process.  The successful commercialization of NIA’s invention of the drug-
eluting coronary stent attests to the length of the process.  As seen in Table 1, approval by 
FDA and the commercial introduction in the United States came over a decade after the 
initial patent application was filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
As seen in Table 1, our story about the technology transfer process for the 
paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent begins with the original USPTO application by the 
inventors, Dr. Sollott and Dr. Kinsella, and ends with the expiration of the USPTO patents 
that followed from that original application.  The application and the permission to practice 
for specified uses whatever U.S. and foreign patents ensued from that application formed 
the basis for NIH granting to Angiotech Pharmaceuticals an exclusive license to use the 
invention.  The family of NIH patent applications and patents worldwide that followed 
from the initial USPTO application in 1993 is shown in Table 2.  
 
 




Patent application Ser. No. 08/099,067 (subsequent applications are continuations of this 
original application, US9906793A to which the subsequent patents are traced)  
4/18/96 Patent application (ultimately granted as US5616608A and published 4/1/97) 
11/7/96 
Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 217, p. 57694, publishes the pre-license notification of the 
intent to grant an exclusive license to Angiotech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to practice the 
inventions in the patents and patent applications related to U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 
08/099,067 filed July 29, 1993; and all continuation applications, divisional applications, 
continuation-in-part applications, and foreign counterpart applications related to U.S. Patent 
Application Serial No. 08/099,067.  
3/21/97 Patent application (ultimately granted as US6429232B1 and published 8/6/02) 
4/1/97 US5616608A published, priority to US9906793A 
7/9/97 Angiotech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. grants co-exclusive license to Boston Scientific Corporation 
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and Cook Incorporated for the drug-eluting stent technology for which Angiotech will be 
granted an exclusive license in 11/19/97 agreement with NIH. 
11/19/97 NIH grants exclusive license to Angiotech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
8/17/00 Patent application (ultimately granted as US6403635B1and published 6/11/02) 
January, 
2002 
Cook files for approval to market in the European Community its paclitaxel-eluting coronary 
stent to combat restenosis, making it the first company to submit for regulatory approval 
anywhere in the world to market a paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent to combat restenosis. 
4/11/02 patent application (ultimately granted as US6500859B2 and published 12/31/02) 
6/11/02 US6403635B1 published, priority to US9906793A 
8/6/02 US6429232B1 published, priority to US9906793A 
September, 
2002 
Cook receives CE Mark approval for its paclitaxel-eluting ACHIEVETM coronary stent in the 
European Community.  It will not be launched in Europe until a ruling is reached regarding 
litigation around the stent. 
September, 
2002 
Cook receives CE Mark approval to market it paclitaxel-eluting V-FlexTM Plus PTX coronary 
stent in the European Community.  Cook will begin selling its new drug-eluting coronary stent 
to European medical institutions immediately. 
12/31/02 US6500859B2 published, priority to US9906793A 
January, 
2003  
Boston Scientific receives CE Mark approval for its TAXUSTM paclitaxel-eluting coronary 
stent system and plans to launch the product next month in Europe and other international 
markets; it plans to launch the product in the United States later in the year. 
February, 
2003 
Boston Scientific initiates the launch in Europe and in other international markets of its 
TAXUSTM paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent system. 
September, 
2003 
Boston Scientific receives approval for sale of its TAXUSTM paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent 
system in Canada and plans to launch the product immediately in Canada. 
March, 
2004 
Boston Scientific receives U.S. FDA approval to market its TAXUSTM paclitaxel-eluting 
coronary stent system and plans to launch the product in the U.S. immediately. 
September, 
2004 
Angiotech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Cook Incorporated announced changes to their license 
agreement regarding paclitaxel-eluting stent products and related technologies. The 1997 
Angiotech License Agreement has been restructured to accommodate Cook’s election to exit 
the coronary vascular field for business reasons and to focus on the development of paclitaxel-
eluting peripheral vascular and gastrointestinal stents. 
September, 
2004 
TAXUS™ was approved for sale in Europe on January 21, 2003 and in the U.S. on March 4, 
2004.  As of September 30, 2004, U.S. TAXUS™ sales surpassed $1.0 billion (U.S. dollars) 
and total worldwide sales exceeded $1.6 billion (U.S. dollars), making the launch of 
TAXUS™ one of the most successful commercial launches in medical history. 
November, 
2004 
Boston Scientific Corporation becomes the exclusive worldwide licensee to Angiotech’s 
coronary drug-eluting stent technology. Under the terms of the 1997 License Agreement 
between Boston Scientific and Angiotech, Boston Scientific’s royalty obligation for sales of 
licensed coronary vascular products (e.g., TAXUS™) will be increased by one percent. This 
will have the effect of increasing Angiotech’s TAXUS™ royalty revenues by approximately 
14% (elevating the royalty tiers to 6%, 8%, and 11%, respectively).   
January, 
2005  
Boston Scientific launched its TAXUS™ Liberte™ paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent system in 
18 countries outside of the European Union and the U.S. The TAXUS Liberte stent system 
features Boston Scientific’s next-generation Liberte™ coronary stent. 
January, 
2005  
Boston Scientific announces the implantation of its millionth TAXUS® Express2™ paclitaxel-
eluting coronary stent system, marking a major milestone for Boston Scientific and for the 
treatment of coronary artery disease. 
September, 
2005  
Boston Scientific begins selling the TAXUS Liberté paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent system 
in Europe 
April, 2005 
Boston Scientific Corporation receives CE Mark approval for three large vessel sizes (4.0mm, 
4.5mm and 5.0mm) of its TAXUS® Express2(TM) paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent system in 
Europe and other international markets. BSC plans to launch the new sizes immediately and 
will continue to supply all sizes of its TAXUS stent systems.  Previously, the largest drug-
eluting stent system size available was 4.0mm, which limited clinicians' options for treating 
patients with large vessels. The launch of Boston Scientific's three large vessel TAXUS stent 
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systems completes its line of sizes available in Europe and international markets, making it the 
first company to offer a full range of stent sizes. 
April, 2007  Boston Scientific receives Japanese approval for the TAXUS® Express2™ stent system. 
April, 2008  
Boston Scientific receives approval for sale in Canada of the TAXUS® LibertéTM paclitaxel-
eluting coronary stent system.  
September, 
2008  
Boston Scientific receives approval from the FDA to market and sell the Taxus Express2 
Atom™ Paclitaxel-Eluting Coronary Stent System in the United States. The TAXUS Atom 
stent systems are the only drug-eluting stents available that are specifically designed to treat 
lesions with diameters as small as 2.25 millimeters. 
October, 
2008  
Boston Scientific receives approval from FDA to market and sell the second generation 
TAXUS Liberté® Paclitaxel-Eluting Coronary Stent System in the United States.      
May, 2009  
Boston Scientific begins sales of the TAXUS Liberté Atom Paclitaxel-Eluting Coronary Stent 
System in the U.S. 
July, 2009 
Boston Scientific begins sales in the U.S. of the TAXUS Liberté Long Stent, which at 38 
millimeters is the longest available drug-eluting stent. 
June, 2010 
Boston Scientific began sales of the TAXUS Element paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent in the 
Europe, its third-generation paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent. 
12/29/10 
Angiotech entered into an amendment to the November 1997 exclusive license agreement with 
NIH.  Per the amendment, NIH agreed to eliminate (i) approximately $7.2 million of unpaid 
royalties and interest due on sales of TAXUS by Boston Scientific, and (ii) future royalties 
payable on licensed products sold by Boston Scientific going forward, in exchange for a 
0.25% increase on the existing royalty rates for licensed products sold by Cook and an 
extension of the term for payment for such royalties of approximately two years. 
February, 
2012 
Boston Scientific receives U.S. FDA approval for the use of the TAXUS Liberte™ and the 
TAXUS ION™ coronary stent systems in patients experiencing an acute myocardial infarction 
(heart attack). 
7/29/13 US6500859B2 expires 
7/29/13 US6429232B1 expires 
7/29/13 US6403635B1 expires 
7/29/13 US5616608A expires 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on European Patent Office’s worldwide patent database PATSTAT, 
USPTO data, and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings by Angiotech Pharmaceuticals and 
Boston Scientific Corporation. 
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Table 2. The Family of NIH Patents for the Paclitaxel-Eluting Stent: Applications for 
“Method of treating atherosclerosis or restenosis using microtubule stabilizing agent” 
Application* Filing Date Published Patent  
Document** 
Publication Date 
U.S. Ser. No. 08/099,067 7/29/93 US9906793A – 
EP19940924519 7/29/94 EP0711158B1 12/3/03 
AT19940924519T 7/29/94 AT255412T  12/15/03 
DK19940924519T 7/29/94 DK0711158T3 3/22/04 
PT19940924519T 7/29/94 PT711158E  4/30/04 
ES19940924519T 7/29/94 ES2210258T3 7/1/04 
DE1994633381T 7/29/94 DE69433381T2 10/7/04 
EP20000128626 7/29/94 EP1118325B1 1/4/06 
AT20000128626T 7/29/94 AT314845T  2/15/06 
DK20000128626T 7/29/94 DK1118325T3 3/20/06 
PT20000128626T 7/29/94 PT1118325E  5/31/06 
ES20000128626T 7/29/94 ES2255477T3 7/1/06 
DE1994634598T 7/29/94 DE69434598T2 10/5/06 
JP19950505996 7/29/94 JP4850985B2 1/11/12 
WO1994US08578 7/29/94 – – 
DE1994634598 7/29/94 – – 
EP20050027952 7/29/94 – – 
DE1994633381 7/29/94 – – 
AU19940074768 7/29/94 – – 
US19960633185 4/18/96 US5616608A  4/1/97 
US19970821906 3/21/97 US6429232B1 8/6/02 
US20000641549 8/17/00 US6403635B1 6/11/02 
US20020121500 4/11/02 US6500859B2 12/31/02 
US20020272496 10/15/02 – – 
US20050304362 12/14/05 – – 
JP20060128856 5/8/06 JP4615478B2 1/19/11 
US20060644411 12/21/06 – – 
US20080072067 2/21/08 – – 
US20090618481 11/13/09 – – 
JP20100125458 6/1/10 JP4997318B2 8/8/12 
US201113086277 4/13/11 – – 
US201113327548 12/15/11 – – 
US201313904928 5/29/13 – – 
*Subsequent applications are continuations of the original application, patent application Ser. No. 08/099,067 
resulting in publication US9906793A, to which the subsequent patents are traced.  Country codes: AT = 
Austria, AU = Australia, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EP = European Patent Office, ES = Spain, JP = 
Japan, PT = Portugal, US = United States, WO = WIPO = World Intellectual Property Organization.  
** Publications with the T designations at the end denote translations of the European patent in the 
cooperating countries.  For example, for the publications for Germany (DE), T2 denotes the translation of the 
corresponding European patent’s specification.  The T3 designation for Denmark (DK) is Denmark’s notation 
indicating that the corresponding European patent specification is valid in Denmark.  The publications for 
Portugal (PT) with the E designations denote the national translations of the two European patents. 
Source: Leech and Scott (2020, Table 2, pp. 164-165), compilation from the European Patent Office’s 
worldwide patent database PATSTAT, and from USPTO data. 
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In choosing Angiotech Pharmaceuticals as the exclusive licensee for the NIH 
patented paclitaxel-eluting stent technology, the NIH Office of Technology Transfer had 
chosen the ideal licensee for developing the technology and realizing its full commercial 
potential.  Angiotech was the ideal licensee because its founder and President and CEO, Dr. 
William L. Hunter, had developed an Angiotech patent portfolio that was highly 
complementary to the NIH patent family, shown in Table 2, for the paclitaxel-eluting stent.  
Dr. Hunter had developed a worldwide family of patents for “Anti-Angiogenic 
Compositions and Methods of Use.”31   The abstract for the invention at the heart of the 
family of patents reads: 
The present invention provides compositions comprising an anti-angiogenic factor, 
and a polymeric carrier. Representative examples of anti-angiogenic factors include 
Anti-Invasive Factor, Retinoic acids and derivatives thereof, and taxol [paclitaxel]. 
Also provided are methods for embolizing blood vessels, and eliminating biliary, 
urethral, esophageal, and tracheal/bronchial obstructions. 
 
Observe from the abstract that paclitaxel is an “anti-angiogenic factor.”  Also, 
observe that the paclitaxel has a polymeric carrier.  Also, it is worth noting that many of the 
patents in the Angiotech family that were granted later, after NIH granted the exclusive 
license to Angiotech, had titles such as “Anti-angiogenic stents and methods of their 
preparation” as was the case for a patent granted to Angiotech by the European Patent 
Office in 2006.  The Angiotech family of patents included patents from patenting 
authorities in many countries.  The family included patents granted (or recognition of the 
granted European patent) by the European Patent Office, Australia, Canada, China, 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Japan, Korea (South), Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, 
Russia, and the United States. The very first patent granted in the Angiotech family for 
“Anti-Angiogenic Compositions and Methods of Use” was EP0706376B1, published on 
June 25, 1997.  The patent application to the European Patent Office was filed on July 19, 
1994.  That application for that patent and all of the others in this Angiotech patent family 
are continuations of the original application U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/094,536, 
filed July 19, 1993, published as US9453693A, to which the subsequent patents are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The following account of the Angiotech family of patents is based on Leech and Scott (2020, Table 3, pp. 
172-174) and was compiled by searching the European Patent Office’s worldwide database, PATSTAT. 
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traced.32  It is the earliest of the two priorities listed for what the European Patent Office 
would refer to in subsequent litigation upholding it as “the Hunter Patent” EP0706376B1.  
The European Patent Office lists the priorities for that patent and the others in the family of 
patents that Dr. Hunter developed for Agiotech as “WO1994CA00373 19940719” and 
“US19930094536 19930719”.  The WO (WIPO) application priority is PCT application 
CA94/00373, filed July 19, 1994, at the same time as the original application to the 
European Patent Office.33  
 
3.3.  The Successful Commercialization of the Paclitaxel-Eluting Coronary Stent   
The combination of the two highly complementary families of patents provided the 
necessary intellectual property protection for the development and very successful 
commercialization of the paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent.  Holding the exclusive license 
to use the technology protected with the family of NIH patents for the paclitaxel-eluting 
coronary stent, and complementing the NIH patent family with its own strong portfolio of 
worldwide patents for “Anti-Angiogenic Compositions and Methods of Use,” Angiotech 
then granted co-exclusive licenses, for production and sale of products using the 
technology, to Cook Incorporated and Boston Scientific Corporation.  As the technology 
transfer process played out, Cook decided to abandon coronary stents and to focus on 
paclitaxel-eluting peripheral vascular and gastrointestinal stents, and so Boston Scientific 
was granted an exclusive license for the coronary stents.  Boston Scientific continually 
developed the paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent technology and sold the stent systems 
worldwide.  As seen in Table 3, Boston Scientific’s TAXUS paclitaxcel-eluting coronary 
stents generated billions of dollars in sales and paid millions of dollars in royalties to 
Angiotech Pharmaceuticals.  Angiotech in turn paid millions of dollars in royalties to NIH 
over the lifetime of the patents. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Thus, the priority for the Angiotech family of patents is dated just 10 days before the priority for the NIH 
family of patents. 
33 An important benefit of NIH’s licensing agreement with Angiotech, rather than entering into a formal 
dispute over the patents and their claims by each of the entities, is that it expeditiously brought a life saving 
technology to the people who could benefit from it most. Any related litigation would have protracted the 
transfer of the technology to clinical practice. 
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Table 3. Royalties and Sales for Paclitaxel-Eluting Coronary Stents 
U.S. nominal $, millions 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Boston Scientific’s sales 
of paclitaxel-eluting 
coronary stentsa 
            
          Total   54.9b 1426c 2400 2200 1600 1200 926 539 363 230 
              U.S.   0 788c 1700 1500 1000 637 411 271 242 149 
              Rest of world   54.9b 638c 700 700 600 563 515 268 121 81 
Royalties, milestone 
payments, and other 
license agreement 
payments for  
paclitaxel-eluting 
coronary stents  
paid to Angiotech by 
Boston Scientificd 
0.0e 6.4f 4.2g 112.3h 183.6 159.5 110.5 84.1 57.4 31.0 20.7 15.1 
Royalties, milestone 
payments, and other 
license fees for  
paclitaxel-eluting 
coronary stents  
paid to NIH by 
Angiotechi 
0.0e 0.0f 1.8g 18.1 28.3 26.0 18.7 14.3 10.4 5.89 0.332j 0.618k 
aBoston Scientific’s net sales, on which royalty payments in a given year to Angiotech Pharmaceuticals are 
based, are for the period October 1 of the preceding year to September 30 of the given year.   
bRoyalties on sales actually made during the period ending December 31, 2003, were only $2.36 million 
because Boston Scientific prepaid royalties made on sales in the first quarter of 2004.  Angiotech took $1.84 
million (U.S.) of the prepayment in 2003, and the rest was taken in 2004.  Royalties actually made through 
December 31, 2003, were approximately 4.3% of eligible drug-eluting stent sales worldwide (there were not 
yet sales in the U.S. or Japan), so the estimate of worldwide paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent sales is $2.36 
million/(0.043) = $54.9 million.   
cIn the years before Angiotech submitted 10K reports, it did not report the sales on which its royalties were 
based, but it did provide the average ratio of its royalties to date as of the end of 2004 to the eligible net sales 
worldwide.  That ratio of 6.9% was used with the royalties (just royalties, no milestone payments or up-frout 
licensing fees) of $98.4 million for the year to estimate worldwide sales of the stents.  The worldwide sales of 
$1426 million = U.S. sales + rest-of-world sales.  From the SEC reports, Angiotech reported the royalty rate on 
sales in the U.S. was approximately 8.1%, and on sales in the rest of the world was approximately 5.45%.  So, 
(0.081)x(U.S. sales) + (0.0545)x(rest-of-word sales) = $98.4 million.  Solving the two equations, U.S. sales 
were approximately $788 million, and the sales in the rest of the world were approximately 638 million. 
dAngiotech Pharmaceutical’s royalties and milestone payments received from Boston Scientific for the 
indicated year ended December 31. Prior to Cook existing the drug-eluting coronary stent business by the 
agreement with Angiotech in September 2004 and with Boston Scientific becoming the exclusive licensee in 
November 2004, some of these royalty and milestone payments to Angiotech are from Cook.   
eFor the 12 months ending September 30, 2001.   
fFor the 12 months ending September 30, 2002; includes $4.6 million in milestone payments from Boston 
Scientific and Cook (royalties on sales were just $0.005 million).  The milestone payment from Cook was 
triggered by Cook filing for regulatory approval to market the paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent in Europe.  The 
milestone payment from Boston Scientific was triggered by its initiation of commercial sales outside the 
regulated markets of Europe, the U.S., and Japan.   
gThe 2003 amount is for the 15 months ending December 31, 2003.   
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hIncludes a $13.9 million payment from Boston Scientific to Angiotech (in conjunction with the November 
2004 grant of the exclusive worldwide license for the drug-eluting coronary stents) for the right to sublicense 
the drug-eluting coronary stent technology to third parties.   
iFor the indicated year ended December 31; includes shared patent costs reimbursed to NIH.  The amount will 
be an overestimate of the payments to NIH for the coronary stents.  Although large payments to licensors are 
noted in the SEC filings and not included in the tabulation of payments to NIH as recorded in this table, the 
reports to the SEC otherwise describe Angiotech’s license and royalty payments to licensors as primarily 
relating to payments to NIH based on the paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent system royalty revenue that 
Angiotech received from Boston Scientific.  Although any noted payments to other licensors are deducted 
from the amounts reported here, some smaller amounts may be included.  Also, some payments to NIH for 
Cook’s use of the paclitaxel-eluting stent technology for applications other than coronary stents may be 
included, although such amounts are deducted when identified the SEC reports.  
jThe decline from 2010 to 2011 is due to an amendment to Angiotech’s exclusive worldwide license 
agreement with NIH; the amendment eliminated certain license and royalty fees payable to NIH on the future 
sales of TAXUS by Boston Scientific Corporation.  In particular, on December 29, 2010, Angiotech entered 
into an amendment to the November 1997 exclusive license agreement with NIH.  Per the amendment, NIH 
agreed to eliminate (i) approximately $7.2 million of unpaid royalties and interest due on sales of TAXUS by 
Boston Scientific, and (ii) future royalties payable on licensed products sold by Boston Scientific going 
forward, in exchange for a 0.25% increase on the existing royalty rates for licensed products sold by Cook and 
an extension of the term for payment for such royalties of approximately two years.   
kThe increase from 2011 to 2012 is primarily due to certain shared patent costs for which NIH was reimbursed 
in 2012.  
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on information in Angiotech Pharmaceutical’s filings with the U.S. 




As observed earlier, the paclitaxcel-eluting stent was NIH’s top royalty earner for 
the banner fiscal year of 2005 when NIH’s royalties were almost $100 million. From Table 
3, we see that the drug-eluting stents generated about $28 million for NIH in 2005. 
To provide some perspective about relative magnitudes of sales and earnings, Table 
4 provides rough estimates of Boston Scientific’s annual gross profits from the sales of the 
stents, and then shows the relative sizes of Boston Scientific’s profits for the stents and 
Angiotech Pharmaceutical’s and NIH’s royalties and milestone payments.34  As shown in 
Table 4, Boston Scientific’s gross profits on the stents were about ten times its payments to 
Angiotech for the exclusive license Angiotech had granted to Boston Scientific.  From the 
time that U.S. sales began in 2004 until NIH agreed on December 29, 2010, to eliminate 
the requirement of Angiotech’s payments of royalties, Angiotech’s royalties and milestone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Gross profits are net sales minus the cost of the products sold.  For the firm as a whole, the gross profits 
must cover operating expenses (selling, general and administrative expenses), R&D expenses, royalty 
expenses, and litigation expenses, among other things. 
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revenues from Boston Scientific’s payments for its exclusive license were about six times 
its payments to NIH for the exclusive license that NIH had granted to Angiotech.  
Thus, from Table 4, we see that the narrowly defined financial return to the 
taxpayers as investors is a very small part of the gross profits on the commercialized 
paclitaxel-eluting stents.  At the same time, as consumers purchasing the stents with public 
funds through Medicare, Medicaid, VA, and ACA, the taxpayers’ funds are supporting a 
large amount of R&D spending that was used over the years by Boston Scientific for 
valuable developments of the paclitaxel-eluting stents.  Both avenues for delivering public 
funding to support R&D are well used in the example of NIA’s paclitaxel-eluting stents.  
We emphasize that the relatively small return to the taxpayers as investors is from a 
decidedly narrowly defined financial point of view.  Society as a whole—the taxpayers 
included—benefited greatly from the commercialization of NIA’s invention because of 
what must be considered by any reckoning to be extraordinarily large benefits for health 
care.  It is important, therefore, that any policy proposal that would improve the return to 
the taxpayers as investors, or that would lower the price paid by the taxpayers in their role 
as consumers of the biomedical product, not reduce appropriate incentives to do R&D and 
generate biomedical innovation.  For that reason, before describing our policy proposal, we 
turn next to a close examination of the incentives issue. 
 
Table 4. Profits and the Relative Sizes of Sales, Profits, and Royalties for Paclitaxel-Eluting 
Coronary Stent ($ figures are nominal) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Boston Scientific’s total sales (U.S. $, 
millions) of paclitaxel-eluting coronary 
stentsa 
54.9 1426 2400 2200 1600 1200 926 539 363 230 
Estimate of Boston Scientific’s gross 
profits (U.S. $, millions) for paclitaxel-
eluting coronary stentsb 
39.7 1098 1871 1579 1152 832.0 634.7 359.5 236.4 155.5 
Royalties, milestone payments, and 
other license agreement payments (U.S. 
$, millions) for  
paclitaxel-eluting coronary stents  
paid to Angiotech by Boston Scientificc 
4.2 112.3 183.6 159.5 110.5 84.1 57.4 31.0 20.7 15.1 
Royalties, milestone payments, and 
other license fees (U.S. $, millions) for  
paclitaxel-eluting coronary stents  
paid to NIH by Angiotechd 
1.8 18.1 28.3 26.0 18.7 14.3 10.4 5.89 0.332 0.618 
Boston Scientific’s gross profits for the 
stents / Angiotech’s revenues from the 
9.5 9.8 10.2 9.9 10.4 9.9 
 
11.1 11.6 11.4 10.3 
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stent royalties, milestones, etc. 
Angiotech’s revenues from the stent 
royalties, milestones, etc. received from 
Boston Scientific / NIH revenues from 
the coronary stent royalties, milestones, 
etc. received from Angiotech 
2.3 6.2 6.5 6.1 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.3 62.3 24.4 
aFrom Table 3; see notes there. 
bGross profits on the paclitaxel-eluting coronary stents are very roughly estimated as the product of Boston 
Scientific’s net sales of the stents for the year (shown in the first row) and Boston Scientific’s ratio for the 
year of total gross profits to its total net sales as reported in its annual 10K reports to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
cFrom Table 3; see notes there. 
dFrom Table 3; see notes there. 





4. The Incentives Issue 
 
4.1.  Three Cases for the Effect of Competition on Biomedical R&D 
Opponents of any government involvement with the negotiations of prices for 
biomedical products express the concerns that the negotiated prices would lessen the 
incentives for biomedical companies to invest in R&D and reduce biomedical innovation.  
Those concerns may also be expressed about our proposal for government royalties to be 
introduced subsequently.  In this section, we address the incentives issue and explain the 
circumstances for which appropriate incentives for R&D remain despite our proposed 
royalties to the government from the sales of biomedical products supported through either 
of the avenues delivering public funding for the development of the products.  Our proposal 
to return royalties (beyond those generated by the negotiated terms for licenses for federal 
laboratory patented inventions such as the paclitaxel-eluting stent) would be likely to lower 
effective prices paid by the taxpayers.  Our proposed policy could take the place of 
negotiated prices, although, as we shall explain, if used as a complementary policy, both it 
and a negotiated price policy would be more effective.   
The royalties that we propose would lower the profits for the successful innovation 
of a new biomedical product.  (1) If a firm had a monopoly of R&D investment to develop 
the product, the knowledge that the return on the innovative R&D investment would be less 
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(because of the anticipated royalties) would lower the monopolist’s R&D investment.  That 
supports the intuition behind the pharmaceutical industry’s position that negotiated prices 
(or in the case of our proposal, royalties) would lower R&D investment with the result that 
there would be less innovation.  However, (2) if there is rivalry among competitors in R&D 
who are pursuing the innovation, it is possible that the competitors will together do more 
R&D investment than the monopolist.  Together, they may overshoot the amount of R&D 
that the monopolist would choose to do, and do so to such an extent that the monopolist’s 
R&D shortfall because of the anticipation of lower profits (whether from negotiated prices 
or royalties) is completely offset.35  The reason is that a firm among a group of rivals will 
invest in R&D as long as it anticipates that its own profits will increase by more than its 
costs, even though the total profits for the set of rivals increases by less than those costs.  
Both the reduction in an R&D monopolist’s innovative investment when it anticipates 
appropriating less of the value of its innovation, and the overshooting by competitors of the 
amount of R&D that would be chosen by the monopolist can be illustrated with formal 
models of R&D.36  
In the simplest of the models, that show R&D competitors replacing the shortfall in 
R&D investment of the monopolist, the rivals are racing to be the winner of the value 
(diminished by the price negotiations or by our royalty proposal), but that value for which 
the rivals compete does not diminish with the competition.  Each rival’s probability of 
winning the prize does diminish, but not the value to be won by the winner of the R&D 
race.  Or, adding to the simplest model, the rivals may anticipate competing substitutes in 
the post-innovation market, and anticipate a set of winners who share the value of the new 
biomedical product.  But, again, in the simplest model, that total value (whether received 
by one sure winner of the R&D race or shared among multiple winners) that the rivals are 
pursuing with their R&D remains the same.  In such models, we find that the competitors 
may replace the monopolist’s shortfall in investment that would be induced by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 These ideas can be traced to a seminal paper by Barzel (1968).  Barzel’s paper, and other early seminal 
contributions such as Scherer (1967) and Kamien and Schwartz (1982) to the understanding of how 
competition affects R&D investment, are reviewed in Baldwin and Scott (1987). 
36 The theory of Loury (1979) as generalized by Lee and Wilde (1980) is one such formal model.  An 
example simulated by using a parameterization of that model, and showing the monopolist’s underinvestment 
in R&D given incomplete appropriation of the investment’s value, and also showing a case where in free-
entry Nash equilibrium competitors will together overshoot the monopolist’s chosen amount of R&D and 
even get close to the socially optimal amount of R&D investment, is provided in Scott (1993, pp. 93-115). 
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anticipated price negotiations or by government royalties that reduced the value to the firm 
or firms introducing the new biomedical product.   
More generally, with R&D rivalry and with the expectation that there would be 
multiple winners who would compete with substitutable biomedical products (for example, 
multiple types of patented drug-eluting coronary stents) in the post-innovation market, the 
total value that is anticipated for the innovation for the winners of the R&D race would 
change as more rivals engage in R&D competition.37  The anticipated total value would be 
eroded because greater competition in the post-innovation market would reduce the 
profitability of each seller.  Nonetheless, we could still have case (2) as long as the 
competition-induced diminishing of value is not too great as competition increases.   
However, the erosion of post-innovation profits because of greater competition may 
be too great for case (2) to obtain.  Thus, given the anticipation of negotiated prices or 
government royalties and a R&D monopolist’s consequent reduction in R&D investment, it 
is possible that R&D competitors pursuing the innovation would together do less R&D than 
the monopolist would choose to do.  The result is that we have two additional cases, and in 
each of these cases, competition among R&D rivals will not replace the shortfall in the 
monopolist’s R&D that would be caused by government negotiation achieving lower prices 
or claiming royalties.  (3) There may be so many R&D competitors that they anticipate in 
the post-innovation market many successful competing substitutable innovative solutions to 
the R&D problem.  With the expectation of many substitutable innovations, some 
developed with imitation using spillovers of ideas from others and whether patented or not, 
the firms expect that profitability in the post-innovation will be low and less R&D 
investment is justified.  Scherer (1980) called this regime where there is too much 
competition to justify large R&D investments as one of insufficient “market room.” 
There is another case where R&D competition will not solve the problem of a 
monopolist’s underinvestment in R&D when anticipation of negotiated prices or royalties 
reduces expected profits from innovation.  (4) In this case, there are not many R&D 
competitors, indeed there are just a few.  However, in equilibrium they each hold back on 
their R&D investment because each anticipates that an increase in R&D would be met by 
aggressive responses of increased R&D from its rivals.  Scott and Scott (2014) refer to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For analysis of the more general possibilities, see Scott (2009). 
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regime, where the total R&D for a few competitors falls as the number of competitors 
increases, as the “Schumpeterian” situation.  
Figure 2 illustrates the three cases for the effect of more competition on R&D 
investment.  R&D investment is measured on the vertical axis, and seller concentration, 
which increases as the number of R&D competitors decreases, is measured on the 
horizontal axis.  Moving from right to left in the diagram, there is more R&D competition.  
At first, when the numbers of competitors are small and strong strategic responses are 
expected, we see case (4) where R&D investment falls as the number of competitors 
increases.  Then, in the middle region of the diagram, we see case (2) where R&D 
investment increases as the number of competitors increases.  Then, in the left-most region 
of the diagram we see case (3) where more competition reduces R&D investment. 
 
Figure 2.  Structural Competition and R&D Investment 
 







Seller Concentration (Fewer Firms) 
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Thus, competition among rivals given the negotiation of biomedical prices or 
government royalties may or may not offset a monopolist’s choice of lower R&D and 
innovation, depending on whether case (2), case (3), or case (4) characterizes the situation 
for the development of a particular biomedical innovation.   
Developing data to test the hypotheses underlying Figure 2 is challenging.  There is 
in the literature one example that considers together all the relations shown in Figure 2.  
That example estimates the complex relationship between R&D and the amount of rivalry 
for U.S. firms’ R&D investment to develop innovations to reduce toxic air emissions in 
manufacturing.38  Because the firms are highly diversified and each do the particular type 
of R&D in multiple markets, the seller concentration measure reflects the average situation 
faced by an industry’s sellers across the R&D-performing firms’ markets.  The empirical 
test (of the hypothesized relationships in Figure 2) was constructed to take advantage of the 
unusual fact that the type of R&D observed was performed by very different types of firms 
that operated in many different industries.  Consequently, in Section 5, we will need to 
develop a very different type of empirical test in order to understand where the competitive 
circumstances for R&D investments in drug-eluting stents fit within the relationships 
depicted in Figure 2. 
Summarizing, to this point in the discussion, economic theory tells us that if there is 
a monopolist of the R&D for a new biomedical product, the anticipation of effective 
government negotiation to lower price or to collect royalties in the post-innovation market 
will lessen the incentive for the monopolist to do R&D.  The monopolist will invest less, 
and less innovation would be expected.  However, if there is rivalry in R&D, with multiple 
firms (who also anticipate lower profits because of the government involvement with 
negotiated prices or royalties) competing to develop the pharmaceutical innovation, they 
may overshoot the monopolist’s chosen amount of R&D investment and invest as much as 
the monopolist would have invested in the absence of anticipated price negotiations or 
royalties.  
Yet it is still the case that the set of rivals would do less R&D than they would do if 
they did not anticipate the lowering of their profits in the post-innovation market because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The estimation of the set of relationships illustrated in Figure 2 is provided in Scott and Scott (2014), 
Figure 8, p. 48. 
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of the government negotiations for lower prices or royalties.  What we’ve shown is that 
competition can replace the monopolist’s shortfall in investment caused by the anticipated 
government actions.  So we’ve shown that in a special set of circumstances, rivalry does 
more R&D than monopoly.  But both market structures still do less than they would 
without price controls or royalties.  Then, we have found that if the monopolist 
underinvests (because of unappropriated spillovers, to consumers and to other firms, of its 
innovation’s value) even without government involvement, it will underinvest even more 
with government negotiations of lower prices or royalties because it anticipates greater 
spillovers of value—it captures less of the value of its innovation.  If there is rivalry in 
R&D, the rivals may—in case (2)—invest more in R&D than the monopolist would, and in 
that case, we anticipate that the R&D investment exceeds the monopolist’s chosen R&D 
investment both with and without lower prices or royalties.   
 
4.2.  Circumstances for Appropriate Incentives for Biomedical R&D 
We next add to the discussion the concept of the socially optimal amount of R&D 
investment.  From a society-wide perspective, we would want R&D investment to increase 
to the point where the additional benefit from more investment equals the cost of the 
investment.39  Investing that amount maximizes the net value of the investment; to invest 
more would lower that net value.  Thus, the monopolist’s R&D is less than the socially 
optimal amount because it does not appropriate all of the social benefits.  When it chooses 
to stop investing, its own marginal benefit equals the marginal cost, but the social marginal 
benefit is still greater.  The monopolist’s chosen R&D is even further below the socially 
optimal amount if a government negotiated lower price or royalties are anticipated, because 
the monopolist’s marginal benefit from additional investment is reduced.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The concept of the socially optimal amount of research has two parts.  One is that additional research is 
done as long as the addition to the benefits (a present discounted value of the stream of benefits) exceeds the 
addition to costs (again a present discounted value, in this case of the stream of costs).  The other part of the 
concept is that by benefits we mean the total economic surplus created, where total economic surplus is the 
sum of the consumer and the producer surpluses.  For illustration of those economic surpluses in the context 
of the technology transfer of inventions created with research in the U.S. federal laboratories, see Link and 
Scott (2019).  An application of the first part of the concept, i.e., the socially optimal amount of research as 
compared the amount of research actually performed, is provided by Scott and Scott (2015) for R&D 
investment in the context of standards – product standards, metrology standards, and regulatory standards to 
address negative externalities.  The concept is one thing; its application in different situations is another.  
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For case (2), rivalry generates more R&D investment than the monopoly amount, 
whether or not there are royalties or government negotiations for lower price.  So, we 
conclude that rivalry, if case (2) obtains, may offset the price-negotiation-induced fall in 
R&D for R&D monopoly, but it suffers its own drop in R&D investment because of the 
anticipated lower profits for the firms introducing the innovation.  In all, the anticipation of 
royalties or negotiations for lower prices will indeed reduce R&D investment in either 
market structure—monopoly R&D or rivalrous R&D—but for case (2), the rivals will do 
more R&D than the monopoly.  The rivals’ R&D will overshoot the monopolist’s R&D 
and may or may not overshoot the socially optimal amount of R&D.   
The top panel of Figure 3 illustrates the case where competition in R&D results in 
overshooting the socially optimal amount of R&D when the government does not negotiate 
lower prices or receive royalties.  The bottom panel of Figure 3 illustrates the change in a 
monopolist’s R&D and the rivals’ R&D if anticipated profits are less because of 
government royalties that we shall propose in Section 6.  For the case shown, the R&D 
outcome with rivals pursuing the innovation is close to the socially optimal amount.  As 
shown, the outcome is closer to the socially optimal amount of R&D than would be the 
case if the government did not receive the royalties that we propose in Section 6.  
 
Figure 3.  The Case Where Government Royalties Bring R&D Closer to the Optimum 
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Source: Authors’ construction 
 
The top panel of Figure 3 shows the case where R&D rivals overshoot the socially 
optimal amount of R&D investment, while a monopolist’s R&D investment falls short of 
the socially optimal level.  That case has been illustrated with the simulation of a 
parameterization of the R&D investment model of Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde 
(1980).40  Their model accounts for uncertainty, parallel paths, and Nash noncooperative 
equilibrium in rivals’ R&D investment.  Because of unappropriated spillover of the value 
of the innovation resulting from the R&D, a monopolist invests less than the socially 
optimal amount, and in the simulation the R&D rivals invest more than the social optimum 
despite the fact that the spillover of the innovation’s value is parameterized to be 90% of 
the innovation’s social value.  In other words, the successful innovator appropriates only 
10% of the innovation’s social value.  Moreover, accounting for both the social value and 
the social cost of the R&D investments, compared to the result for monopoly, the free-entry 
noncooperative equilibrium for the rivals has social profit closer to its maximum that is 
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reached with the socially optimal R&D investment.41  The royalties proposal to be 
discussed in Section 6 would not lower an innovator’s appropriated returns as dramatically 
as is the case in the simulation underlying the top panel of Figure 3.  The policy of 
government royalties for innovations developed with substantial public funding might not 
only result in R&D investment closer to the social optimum as illustrated in the bottom 
panel of Figure 3, but it might also be the case that the investment would overshoot the 
socially optimal amount despite the anticipation of the royalties. 
The development of biomedical innovations is enhanced by cooperative activities 
not only among private biomedical companies and researchers in federal laboratories and 
researchers at universities, but also among the biomedical companies themselves.  For that 
reason, we emphasize that the rivalrous R&D that we have described and that can lead to 
the fortuitous outcome depicted in Figure 3 does not preclude cooperative activity also 
being present.  Baumol (2002) explains if we think broadly about innovation rivalry in the 
context of the positive externalities from the spillovers of knowledge and in the context of 
the actual behavior of firms with licensing and joint ventures and other forms of sharing 
technology, rivalrous R&D among competitors may—despite the concerns about 
underinvestment in R&D—perform quite well.  In particular, Baumol explains that the 
R&D rivals have the necessary incentives to share even some of their proprietary 
technology.42  It is also important to emphasize that while the good performance of the 
rivalrous R&D outcome depicted in Figure 3 would not be a perfectly efficient outcome 
that could be described theoretically, as a practical matter the best solution may well be 
what Baumol (2002, pp. 19-29) refers to as the “somewhat optimal” performance of R&D 
rivals.43  
In the next section, we examine competitive circumstances for the drug-eluting 
coronary stent and argue that the theoretical situation depicted in Figure 3 actually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Scott (1993, pp. 109-110). 
42 See Baumol’s discussions (2002, pp. 73-113) of the voluntary dissemination of proprietary technology and 
the markets for technology trading even among competitors engaged in rivalrous R&D investments. 
43 Scott (1995) shows that when a monopoly of R&D, or a completely cooperative R&D effort among firms, 
would result in technical efficiencies, the resulting underinvestment in R&D because of incomplete 
appropriation of returns can be overcome in theory with a well-designed public policy that simulates the 
competitive pressures that would increase R&D investment while allowing the technical efficiencies of the 
monopoly or completely cooperative effort.  However, such a well-designed public policy is not practical, and 
the situation with rivalrous R&D shown in Figure 3 is expected to be the best practical outcome. 
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describes well the situation for the development of coronary stents as well as biomedical 
products more generally.  Thus, from the many possibilities for the R&D incentive effects 
from government royalties on the sales of biomedical products developed with taxpayers’ 
investments, the possibility to be expected, we argue, would typically be the good outcome 
depicted in Figure 3—namely the case where R&D rivalry in the context of government 
involvement results in an amount of R&D investment close to the socially optimal level.   
Thus, to advance that argument, we turn next to looking at the history of R&D 
competition for the drug-eluting stent example.  However, before looking at the example, 
we observe that two key facts about biomedical R&D competition underlie the argument 
that government royalties provide a way—without having adverse incentives on biomedical 
R&D—to avoid the situation where taxpayers pay twice to an unacceptable extent—once 
to support the development of new biomedical products and then again to purchase them at 
what are perceived to be unreasonable prices.  The two key facts about R&D competition 
underlying the argument are as follows.   
First, no biomedical firm really has a monopoly of R&D.  It may be the only firm 
doing research on its particular product, but typically there are others who are doing R&D 
on their own product developments that would provide competing substitute products in a 
post-innovation market.  A biomedical firm may create the one winner among all of those 
pursuing product developments to provide the particular product that all of them are 
pursuing with their individual R&D investments.  But while there may be a monopoly in 
the post innovation market, there is not a monopoly of R&D.  Second, innovation in the 
biomedical industry often has a “me-too” character because many alternative treatments are 
developed for the same health condition.  A successful innovation is often followed by 
innovations that offer biomedical products that are competing substitutes; thus, typically 
there will not be a monopoly in the post-innovation market either.  
 
5. The Circumstances Affecting Incentives for the Development of Drug-Eluting 
Stents 
 
5.1.  Scherer’s Virtuous Competitive Rent-Seeking 
   
To illustrate the foregoing ideas and to discuss them in the context of an important 
biomedical innovation that received substantial public funding from both of the two 
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avenues that we have discussed in Section 2, we shall consider the details about the R&D 
competitors in the development of drug-eluting coronary stents, our main example.  We 
want to describe the correspondence between the R&D competition in the biomedical 
industry, as illustrated with the situation for drug-eluting stents, and the set of 
circumstances where that competition can make government royalties and appropriate 
incentives compatible.  The essential question to be addressed is whether Figure 3 
reasonably describes the situation for biomedical R&D.  In fact, Scherer (2010, pp. 564-
569) makes the argument that the answer is yes for the development of new 
pharmaceutical/medical products.   
Scherer first observes (2010, p. 562) that the gross margins on sales for the 
pharmaceutical industry are among the very highest for all industries.  Consistent with his 
observations for the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, looking at our Table 4 in Section 
3, we see that our estimate of Boston Scientific’s gross margins on the sales for the 
paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent, a medical device using the drug paclitaxel and the NIA 
paclitaxel-eluting coronary stent technology licensed from Angiotech Pharmaceuticals, 
averaged about 70% over the decade from 2003 through 2012.  Scherer explains (2010, p. 
562) that despite the high gross margins, when R&D expenditures are appropriately 
capitalized, accounting for the fact that R&D is a long-lived investment, the pharmaceutical 
industry does not appear to earn a supranormal rate of return given the extreme riskiness of 
their R&D investments.44      
Second, Scherer explains (2010, pp. 564-569) the observation of high gross 
margins, high R&D to sales, and yet returns on investment that (with R&D expenditures 
capitalized) are only moderately above all-industry norms.  He explains the set of 
observations with a combination of the ideas in Barzel’s and his own seminal papers 
(Barzel, 1968; Scherer, 1967) and empirical evidence.  He assumes what in Section 4 we 
called case 2, and then he creates and explains the theoretical situation where the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Essentially,	  what	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  to	  be	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relationship between rivalrous R&D and the social optimum is as described in the top panel 
of Figure 3.   
In all, Scherer explains that for the pharmaceutical industry the high gross margins, 
high R&D, and the absence of supranormal profit may reflect the possibility that rivalrous 
R&D results in R&D investment close to the social optimum: 
An explanation in … accord with the evidence and consistent with received 
theory is that pharmaceutical companies engage in competitive rent-seeking 
behavior … of a virtuous character … .  That is, when rents [reflected in the gross 
margins] are high, the companies compete vigorously to capture them by 
increasing their R&D (and promotional) outlays, and indeed, the companies 
compete so vigorously, there is little left over in the end for supranormal profit. 
(Scherer, 2010, p. 564). 
 
We conclude that the competitive rent-seeking observed in the pharmaceutical 
industry can help correct what otherwise might be market failures attributable to 
uncertainty and the disparity between social and privately appropriable benefits.  
Whether the “correct” amount of R&D, associated in part with the pursuit of 
parallel paths, … is a problem on which additional research, both theoretical and 
factual, is much to be desired. (Scherer, 2010, p. 569) 
 
 
5.2.  R&D Rivalry in the Development of Drug-Eluting Stents 
We have seen that Scherer (2010, p. 569) calls for more work to ascertain whether 
in fact the theoretical possibility of an outcome close to the socially optimal amount of 
R&D, consistent with the evidence he reviews, obtains for the pharmaceutical industry.  To 
that call, and for the biomedical industry more generally, we respond by developing the 
history of the R&D rivalry that has driven the evolution of drug-eluting coronary stents.  
We have emphasized that for the story of Figure 3 to obtain, the relationship between 
structural competition and R&D investment must be the one for case 2 where a larger 
number of competitors results in greater R&D investment.  Figure 2 shows theoretical 
possibilities including cases 1 and 3 as well as case 2.  The question is: where does the 
R&D rivalry for the development of drug-eluting coronary stents fit—does it correspond to 
case 2 and to Scherer’s description of virtuous rent-seeking R&D investment by rivals? 
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To answer the question, we examine the historical record for the FDA premarket 
approvals for coronary stents and stent systems.  The FDA describes premarket approval (PMA) 
as follows45: 
Premarket approval (PMA) is the FDA process of scientific and regulatory review to evaluate 
the safety and effectiveness of Class III medical devices. Class III devices are those that support 
or sustain human life, are of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, 
or which present a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury. Due to the level of risk 
associated with Class III devices, FDA has determined that general and special controls alone 
are insufficient to assure the safety and effectiveness of Class III devices. Therefore, these 
devices require a premarket approval (PMA) application under section 515 of the FD&C Act in 
order to obtain marketing approval. … 
PMA is the most stringent type of device marketing application required by FDA. The 
applicant must receive FDA approval of its PMA application prior to marketing the device. 
PMA approval is based on a determination by FDA that the PMA contains sufficient valid 
scientific evidence to assure that the device is safe and effective for its intended use(s). 
The PMA applicant is usually the person who owns the rights, or otherwise has authorized 
access, to the data and other information to be submitted in support of FDA approval. This 
person may be an individual, partnership, corporation, association, scientific or academic 
establishment, government agency or organizational unit, or other legal entity. The applicant is 
often the inventor/developer and ultimately the manufacturer. 
Coronary stents and stent systems are Class III medical devices and require FDA 
premarket approval.  We can therefore use the time series of FDA premarket approvals to 
document the intensity of R&D rivalry among the several firms developing coronary stents and 
stent systems during the time reviewed in Section 3’s history for the paclitaxel-eluting coronary 
stent.  As described in Section 3.1, after the launch of the paclitaxel-eluting stent, drug-eluting 
coronary stents of several firms were being continually introduced, developed and improved.  
Boston Scientific’s paclitaxel-eluting stents were no exception; they continued to evolve as Table 
1’s history shows. 
Several firms were developing coronary stents and stent systems with R&D 
investments.  The results of the R&D competition can be seen in the historical record of the 
FDA’s premarket approvals for the coronary stents and stent systems being developed.  We 
searched the FDA PMA database.46  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-approval-pma. 
46 https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPMA/pma.cfm.  We searched by year, so for example 
for 2014, we entered the search dates from 01/01/2014 to 12/31/2014, and for the device we entered coronary 
stent. 
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Table 5 shows the yearly premarket approvals and the number of different firms 
that applied for approvals.  The yearly record is shown beginning in 2002, the year before 
Boston Scientific (the exclusive licensee of Angiotech Pharmaceuticals once Cook Inc. 
withdrew from the coronary stent market in 2004) began selling the paclitaxel-eluting 
coronary stent.  We end the yearly record in 2012, the last year before the basic USPTO 
patents for the paclitaxel-eluting stent—that were the basis for the exclusive license to 
Angiotech and then Angiotech’s original co-exclusive licenses to Cook Inc. and Boston 
Scientific—expired.  Because the coronary stents and stent systems were being developed 
continuously, there are multiple approvals for a firm’s stent system as new developments 
occur and new applications for premarket approvals are made so that the latest 
development is FDA approved for commercial use.   As the development process proceeds, 
there are changes to the specifications (for example for the size of the stent) or formulations 
(for example for the eluting drug and details of the delivery of the drug) or target 
populations or applications (for example those presenting with an acute heart attack).  With 
each change as R&D generates an evolution of a coronary stent system, new applications 
are filed to ensure that the latest version of the medical device has the FDA’s approval. 
From Table 5, we see the manifestation of the R&D rivalry between the firms that 
were developing coronary stents and stent systems.  We see the rivalry as it is reflected in 
the stream of resulting product developments that received FDA premarket approvals.  
Looking at the premarket approvals over the years, we see just what Scherer’s hypothesis 
of virtuous rent-seeking R&D predicts.  Gross margins for coronary stents, just as for 
biomedical products more generally, were high.  The six firms—just five after Cook exited 
the coronary stent market to focus on using the paclitaxel-eluting stents for peripheral 
vascular applications—that were developing the new coronary stents and stent systems 
were competing with R&D to bring improved products to market, products that they 
continually developed and improved.  We see their virtuous rent-seeking behavior in the 
growing stream of the premarket approvals that the FDA granted to them.  Their rivalrous 
R&D efforts to develop their products and win bigger shares of the coronary stent market 
are in essence monitored and measured with the record of the PMAs granted by the FDA. 
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Table 5. U.S. FDA Premarket Approvals (PMAs) for Coronary Stents or Stent Systems 







The firms receiving PMAs 
2002 28 4 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp.; Cook, Inc.; 
Medtronic Ireland 
2003 19 4 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp.; Cordis Corp.; 
Medtronic Ireland 
2004 20 5 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp.; Cordis Corp.; 
Medinol Ltd.; Medtronic Ireland 
2005 33 5 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Biotronik GMBH & Co. KG; Boston 
Scientific Corp.; Cordis Corp.; Medtronic Ireland 
2006 50 4 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp; Cordis Corp.; 
Medtronic Ireland 
2007 52 5 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp; Cordis Corp.; 
Medinol Ltd.; Medtronic Ireland 
2008 87 5 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp; Cordis Corp.; 
Medinol Ltd.; Medtronic Ireland 
2009 109 4 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp; Cordis Corp.; 
Medtronic Ireland 
2010 126 4 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp; Cordis Corp.; 
Medtronic Ireland 
2011 151 4 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp; Cordis Corp.; 
Medtronic Ireland 
2012 222 5 Abbott Vascular, Inc.; Boston Scientific Corp; Cordis Corp.; 
Medinol Ltd.; Medtronic Ireland 
Note: Cordis Corp. was a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson throughout the years covered in Table 5; in 2015, 
Cardinal Health completed the acquisition of Cordis Corp. from Johnson & Johnson.  At times the FDA 
records use the names of subsidiaries of the parent firms, and we have grouped those and listed the firms by 
the names of the parent firms.  For example, we have just listed Boston Scientific Corp. to represent both the 
PMAs granted to it and to its subsidiary Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. 
Source: Authors’ compilations from https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPMA/pma.cfm.  
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Figure 4 shows that from the first year of Boston Scientific’s sales of the paclitaxel-
eluting coronary stents until the last year that the basic USPTO patents for the NIA/NIH 
technology were in force, the R&D rivals in the market for coronary stents continually 
developed their products as they fought for larger shares of the gross profits from the 
worldwide sales of stent systems. 
 
Figure 4.  U.S. Federal Drug Administration (FDA) Premarket Approvals (PMAs): 2003-2012   
 
Source: Table 5. 
 
When we compare the historical record for the FDA PMAs with the worldwide 
sales of coronary stents, we have not only evidence supporting Scherer’s conceptualization 
of the R&D rivalry as virtuous rent-seeking R&D, with the outcome possibly the good 
outcome depicted in Figure 3 where the rivalrous R&D approximates the socially optimal 
amount.  In addition, there is evidence that could support the view that “possibly” could be 
replaced with “reasonably” in the assessment of the likelihood that Figure 3’s theoretical 
depiction reflects the actual situation.  As shown in Table 6 and Figure 5, although FDA 
PMA’s continually climbed throughout the period 2003 through 2012, measuring the 
continuing and increasing R&D rivalry among the firms competing for market share in the 
worldwide coronary stent market, in 2006 worldwide sales began a decline.  The history 
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brings out the story of the virtuous rent-seeking behavior as firms enter new stent systems 
in the drug-eluting stent market; and consequently, the share of the early market leader, 
Boston Scientific, declines.  As we discuss the history, we will use the nominal values for 
the sales of coronary stent sales, corresponding to the way those sales were discussed by 
the participants in the market.  We have in Table 6 also provided the sales values in 
constant dollars of 2012, and then Figure 5 plots the constant dollar sales over time to have 
the annual sales that are depicted in the figure measured in dollars of constant purchasing 
power.  
 
Table 6. Worldwide Sales of Coronary Stents for All Companies and for Boston Scientific: 
Sales ($ millions) for Bare Metal Stents and Drug-Eluting Stents, 2003-2012 
year Boston Scientific All Companies 
 Nominal $ Constant 2012 $a Nominal $ Constant 2012 $a 
2003 528 640 3600 4361 
2004 2351 2773 4750 5603 
2005 2693 3081 5900 6749 
2006 2506 2782 6000 6662 
2007 2027 2192 5000 5406 
2008 1851 1963 5000 5303 
2009 1879 1978 5000 5263 
2010 1670 1738 5000 5202 
2011 1620 1651 4750 4841 
2012 1363 1363 5400 5400 
aConstant 2012 dollars using the U.S. GDP implicit price deflator; the narrative in the text uses the nominal 
dollars. 
Sources:  Boston Scientific’s worldwide sales are compiled from its 10K filings with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, https://sec.report/CIK/0000885725/. While the numbers for Boston Scientific’s 
worldwide coronary stent sales are all available in its annual 10K filings with the U.S. SEC, the estimates for 
the combined worldwide coronary stent sales from all firms were not always provided in the 10K reports.  For 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, Boston Scientific did provide estimates of the worldwide sales 
across all firms, so the annual 10K filings for those years are the source.  For 2011 and 2012, the annual 10K 
reports had the details about Boston Scientific’s worldwide sales in the DES market and in the BMS market.  
We used those Boston Scientific sales figures along with the information in its annual 10K reports about its 
shares of the worldwide DES and BMS market, augmented with outside information from GlobalData, 
Medipoint: Coronary Stents – Global Analysis and Market Forecasts, November 2014, p. 6, 
https://www.marketresearch.com/product/sample-8538829.pdf], to estimate for 2011 and 2012 the combined 
worldwide coronary stent sales for all firms. Boston Scientific annual 10K reports for 2003 and 2004 did not 
provide combined worldwide coronary stent sales for all firms, and there was not in the reports sufficient 
information to estimate the combined sales.  So for 2003, we used for the worldwide combined DES sales the 
estimate from https://www.massdevice.com/abbott-and-boston-scientific-dominate-46-billion-drug-eluting-
stent-market/, and for the BMS estimate we used the estimate provided at 
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/companies-markets-abbott-laboratories-dominates-global-bare-metal-
stents-market, and summed the two figures.  The estimate for 2004 is the average of the estimate for 2003 and 
the estimate for 2005 given in Boston Scientific’s 10K annual report for that year.  A confirming independent, 
rough estimate, essentially the same, was found at https://us.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-
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assets/14147_book_item_14147.pdf by summing the sales given there for the coronary stent markets for U.S., 





Figure 5.  Worldwide Sales (constant 2012 $ millions) of Coronary Stents: Bare Metal Stents 
and Drug-Eluting Stents, 2003-2012   
 





The first FDA approvals for coronary BMSs were granted in 1993 to Cook, Inc. (for 
acute closures) followed in 1994 to Johnson & Johnson subsidiary Cordis Corp. (for 
elective use).47  Several other companies received approvals for BMSs during the 1990s.48  
In 1998, Boston Scientific-SciMed entered the BMS stent market with the NIR™ stent in 
the United States after having introduced it in Europe in 1996.  Initially, sales were $211 
million or 13% of the worldwide coronary stent market.49  Subsequent models with more 
advanced features, e.g., self-expanding, bioslide coating, a filter to catch embolic material, 
and the Liberte™ have been introduced and BMS stents have consistently accounted for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Htay and Liu (2005, p. 264). 
48 Iqbal et al. (2013, p. 196). 
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approximately 10-15 % of Boston Scientific’s coronary stent revenues and 10-20% on the 
global stent market.50  
In 2003 and 2004, Boston Scientific marketed the TAXUS®Express™ stent, first in 
international markets (primarily Europe) and then in the United States.  Despite following 
Cook’s short-lived entry with its paclitaxel-coated stent and Johnson & Johnson’s 
sirolimus-coated Cypher stent, Boston Scientific quickly became the world leader in the 
drug-eluting stent market.51  In 2004, coronary stent sales were $2,351 million  ($2,143 
million DES), which accounted for 38% of Boston Scientific net sales.52  At the time, the 
worldwide stent market was estimated to be $4.75 billion.53  Almost immediately, a second 
generation of DES, the TAXUS® Liberté ™ coronary stent system, was introduced by 
Boston Scientific in 18 countries and, in 2005, in the United States.54  Coronary stent 
revenue was $2,693 million and represented 43 percent of consolidated net sales for Boston 
Scientific in 2005.  This represented a peak in the sales of DES for Boston Scientific during 
the time period studied. 
In the second half of 2005, Boston Scientific started to experience a decline in US 
sales of DES revenues compared to the same period the preceding year. This was attributed 
to both a reduction in market share and pricing pressure.55  Johnson and Johnson’s DES, 
the Cypher® stent, was a direct competitor.56    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  See Colombo et al. (2017), and “Coronary Stents – Global Analysis and Market Forecasts,” GlobalData, 
https://www.marketresearch.com/product/sample-8538829.pdf.  
51 Cook was the first to get a drug-eluting coronary stent to market, introducing its paclitaxel-coated V-Flex 
Plus PTX coronary stent in Europe in September 2002 (see Table 1).  But Cook exited the market in 2004 to 
focus on peripheral vascular applications of the NIH-patented technology (see Table 1).  Boston Scientific 
launched its TAXUSTM coronary stent system in Europe in 2003 before launching it in the U.S. the next year 
(see Table 1).  As Kling (2005) reports in great detail, Boston Scientific had been very deliberative and 
careful as it used a series of clinical trials to perfect its paclitaxel-eluting stent.  By the time it launched the 
product, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) had already launched its sirolimus-eluting Cypher stent.  However, as 
Kling (2005) details, J&J had heavily marketed its drug-eluting stent, distributing the results of its final, pre-
launch clinical trial in advance of the launch and creating great demand.  But just before the launch, the FDA 
informed J&J that it could not sell stents that were more than six months old.  Consequently, it had to discard 
thousands of stents, and for its launch it was left with just 40,000 stents.  However there were 100,000 
patients in whom cardiologists had expected to implant the stents.  Cardiologists were not happy with J&J, 
and Boston Scientific soon stepped into the breech, and quickly it had 70% of the DES market. 
52  https://sec.report/Document/0000950135-05-001479/. 2004 Boston Scientific 10K SEC Filing. 
53 Ibid. 
54 https://sec.report/Document/0001047469-06-002665/. 2005 Boston Scientific 10K SEC Filing. 
55 Ibid. 
56 https://sec.report/CIK/0000885725/58#documents. 2006 Boston Scientific SEC Filing. 
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In 2006, there was a further overall decline in Boston Scientific stent sales in spite 
of the introduction of a second stent system through Guidant’s XIENCE™ V everolimus-
eluting DES program (which was shared with Abbott).  U.S. TAXUS sales declined to 
$1.561 billion for 2006 as compared to $1.763 billion for 2005 (International sales 
remained constant).  The decline was primarily attributed to a decline in the overall United 
States market due to concerns of late in-stent thrombosis, a potential complication, and a 
decline in the overall PTCA market, with lower device utilization.  The only DES 
competitor in the United States marketplace at this time was Johnson and Johnson’s 
Cypher® stent.57    
The worldwide stent market declined by $1 billion between 2006 and 2007.  Even 
though their product line expanded with the acquisition of Guidant, a competitor in the 
DES market, and with the marketing of a new privately labeled stent system, 
PROMUSeverolimus-eluting stents, from Abbott, Boston Scientific’s stent business 
declined.58  In 2007, TAXUS® stent sales in the United States declined by $555 million or 
36%.  Still Boston Scientific remained the market leader in the United States with 55% 
market share. 
In 2008, the worldwide stent market remained stable and reduced concern over in-
stent thrombosis led to a positive trend in the DES market. However, Boston Scientific’s 
DES stent sales in the United States declined by 17% attributed in part to Abbott’s launch 
of the competing XIENCEV stent system and increased pricing pressure, while the 
international sales increased by 2%, in part because of increased sales in Japan.59  
The global market for drug-eluting coronary stents increased in 2009 as concern 
about in stent restenosis abated, and the DES market share gains were balanced by BMS 
losses. However, a negative study of the TAXUS® stent by a competitor, adversely 
affected Boston Scientific’s sales (down approximately 30%) of that stent, while sales of 
Boston Scientific’s other DES stent, the PROMUS®, increased and compensated for this 
decrease. Overall DES sales were up by 9% and overall stent sales remained the same as in 
2008.60   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid. 
58 https://sec.report/Document/0001072613-08-000584/. 2007 Boston Scientific 10K SEC Filing. 
59 Boston Scientific 2008 10 K filing (https://sec.report/Document/0001072613-09-000419/). 
60 Boston Scientific 2009 10 K filing (https://sec.report/Document/0000950123-10-017254/). 
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From 2009 through 2012, Boston Scientific’s stent sales declined, while the global 
market exhibited a decline followed by the beginnings of a rebound.  However, Boston 
Scientific maintained its leadership position in the stent market, having a BMS and the two 
DES stent systems (TAXUS® and PROMUS ®) in their 2nd and 3rd generations and 
marketed in the U.S., the Europe/Middle East/Africa (EMEA) region and certain Inter-
Continental countries, including China beginning in the fourth quarter of 2011.  In 2010, 
net worldwide sales of coronary stents were essentially unchanged compared to 2009, 
while Boston Scientific’s global DES market-share decreased from 41% to 36% with 
increased competition and pricing pressure.  Worldwide stent sales declined in 2011 by 5%, 
largely due to a decline in the United States market by 7% (international sales increased by 
4%).  Even though a competitor left the market, there was a significant increase in pricing 
pressure.  Boston Scientific’s estimated market share of the U.S. DES market increased by 
2% during this period (46% to 48%) with the introduction of a new generation of the 
PROMUS® Element stent.   In 2012, no new stent systems were introduced by Boston 
Scientific as the global coronary stent market began a rebound, but Boston Scientific’s 
worldwide coronary stent net sales decreased by 16% or $257 million in the face of 
continued competition and pricing pressures.  United States sales of DES by Boston 
Scientific decreased by 5%.61   
Even as the gross profits to be won with a larger share of the market declined 
markedly, the competitors continued to develop their products in the hope of winning a 
larger share of the declining profits.  The behavior strongly supports Scherer’s rent-seeking 
hypothesis and the expectation that the rivalrous R&D would overshoot the socially 
optimal amount, as in the top panel of Figure 3.  The fact that R&D rivalry was so strongly 
sustained even as the market declined also supports the expectation that a policy of 
government royalties, which would lower the firms’ expected profitability of sales, would 
not greatly suppress R&D investment.  Hence, the bottom panel of Figure 3 may reflect a 
result to be reasonably expected.  We can of course not prove that to be the case, but the 
evidence supports the result as something reasonable to expect.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Boston Scientific 10K reports for 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively at 
https://sec.report/Document/0000950123-10-017254/, https://sec.report/Document/0000950123-11-015112/, 
https://sec.report/Document/0000885725-12-000006/, https://sec.report/Document/0000885725-13-000007/.  
	   49	  
With a profitable market, even when the anticipated profits are diminished, each of 
the R&D rivals invests as long as it anticipates the gain in its own profits will exceed its 
own investment costs, and without regard for the impact of its success on its rivals’ profits.  
It is our case 2 of Section 4 with a vengeance.  Such behavior can take the rivals’ collective 
investment well beyond the socially optimal investment as in the top panel of Figure 3.  
Adding our proposed policy of government royalties to the rivals’ expectations may well 
dampen their enthusiasm for R&D investment just enough to bring their collective 
investments back closer to the socially optimal amount, as in the bottom panel of Figure 3.   
We turn next to a description of the proposed policy for government negotiation of 
royalties on the sales of biomedical products developed with significant public funding.  
 
6. A Proposal for Government Royalties for Biomedical Products Developed with 
Substantial Public Funding for R&D 
 
6.1.  Efficiency Implications of Government Royalties 
Kennedy (2019) reviews the literature supporting the perspective that price controls 
would imply a reduction of pharmaceutical R&D and hence the stream of new 
pharmaceutical products that bring great benefits to society.  As we explained in Section 4, 
that perspective and the concern it causes, even in the context of contemplated price 
controls such as those being considered by Congress in 2019, overlooks a scenario—
depicted in Figure 3 of Section 4—that can reasonably be expected to characterize R&D 
for pharmaceutical and other biomedical products.  Namely, with R&D rivalry, the private 
R&D is expected to overshoot the socially optimal amount despite the R&D rivals’ 
incomplete appropriation of the returns for R&D investment.   
There are exceptions to that expectation, such as for orphan drugs, drugs for rare 
diseases more generally, or for some vaccines for which anticipated returns fall short of 
covering costs for development and regulatory approval, and the exceptional cases should 
be treated differently in any policy proposed to address the issue of consumers having to 
pay exceptionally high prices for the very products that they financed with their tax 
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dollars.62  No less, the exceptional cases must be addressed in the proposal for royalties that 
we offer in this section.  However, the royalties we propose would dampen R&D incentives 
less than price controls because the controls create uncertainty about the post-innovation 
price that may be decreased arbitrarily from what would emerge as the market price.  In 
contrast, the schedules and formulas for the proposed royalties would be extant public 
knowledge.   
Since we are proposing royalties as an alternative policy, or as a complement to 
price controls, we begin by discussing the efficiency implications of the royalties.  
Although royalties are commonly used as a way for investors to recoup a return on their 
investment, they could be viewed as a tax on the sales of the product that the investment 
enabled.  That the royalties would be viewed as essentially a sales tax would seem 
especially likely when the investor whose investment is being repaid with the royalties is 
the government, that is, the taxpayers.  Viewed as a sales or excise tax, the royalties would 
drive the proverbial wedge between the price of the product and its true social cost.  
However, the royalty payment is not a tax, and instead is intended to cover the opportunity 
cost of the investors’ funds.  If the royalty rate were set at a level such that in equilibrium 
the annual royalty payment equaled the normal annual return on the taxpayers’ invested 
funds, there is no wedge driven between the equilibrium price and the social marginal cost 
for the good.   
To explain the concept, we use a simple case.  Figure 6 depicts the case where the 
annual royalty payment necessary to provide the normal return H on the government’s 
investment toward the development of the product is obtained in equilibrium.  The case 
depicted is a very simple case where the government’s investment supported an invention 
of a new product in a laboratory of a federal agency or a university.  For the simple case 
depicted, the federal agency or the university provided nonexclusive licenses to use the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 An “orphan drug” is one that has been designated that status by the FDA because the pharmaceutical 
product is needed by so few patients that pharmaceutical companies could not reasonably anticipate 
recovering the costs for developing it.  The FDA explains: “The Orphan Drug Act (ODA) provides for 
granting special status to a drug or biological product (“drug”) to treat a rare disease or condition upon 
request of a sponsor. This status is referred to as orphan designation (or sometimes “orphan status”). For a 
drug to qualify for orphan designation both the drug and the disease or condition must meet certain criteria 
specified in the ODA and FDA’s implementing regulations at 21 CFR Part 316.”  
 https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseases-conditions/designating-orphan-product-
drugs-and-biological-products. 
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invention, and the licenses were provided to all firms that wanted the licenses.  Those firms 
then used the invention to produce and sell a product in a competitive market.  In return for 
the nonexclusive license, each firm agreed to pay a royalty fee to the agency per unit of the 
product sold, with that royalty per unit sold denoted by r.  The right panel of Figure 6 
shows the equilibrium output (q*) and the costs for the individual firm, with its average 
costs (AC), average variable costs (AVC), and marginal costs (MC).  The left panel of 
Figure 6 depicts the market equilibrium for the industry, with the market demand (D), 
market supply (S), and equilibrium price (P*) and equilibrium output (Q*). 
 
Figure 6.  Socially Optimal Production with Royalties  
 
Source: Authors’ construction. 
 
In the competitive equilibrium depicted in Figure 6, the annual royalty payment H 
is the amount rQ*, where Q* is the competitive equilibrium output for the market, and H 
equals the normal return on the government’s investment in the new product.  The 
equilibrium price of the product covers all of its opportunity costs, including the normal 
return on the government’s investment.  Observe that if the royalty were eliminated, in the 
short run the supply curve in the market would shift from S to S1 with the drop in each 
firm’s costs, and there would be supranormal profits.  In the longer run, there would be 
more capacity in the industry, and the supply curve would shift to S2 to restore normal 
economic profits.  However, observe that in that equilibrium without the royalty, the 
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production has gone beyond the amount Q* for which marginal social value of another unit 
of output equals its marginal social cost.  As a practical matter, it would be impossible to 
set the royalty rate at the ideal level shown, but the point is that the royalty is to cover an 
opportunity cost of the product that uses the federal agency’s transferred technology.  
The situation that would be analogous to our case of the invention of the drug-
eluting stent is more involved because the federal agency gave an exclusive license to 
Angiotech, and it in turn gave a co-exclusive license to Cook and to Boston Scientific, and 
then ultimately granted Boston Scientific an exclusive license.  The ultimate market 
equilibrium for the sales of coronary stents would be reasonably characterized as a 
differentiated-product oligopoly equilibrium that would result in the wake of the virtuous 
rent-seeking R&D for the R&D rivalry as described in Section 5.  Whether we have the 
simplest case as depicted in Figure 6, or instead a more complicated case, the point remains 
that the royalty payment is not a tax that necessarily drives a wedge between price and true 
social cost, but instead it is an opportunity cost of a normal return on investment that 
should be covered by the price of the product.  There is, however, an important difference 
for the more complicated and realistic case with rivalry among oligopolists that offer 
competing substitutes in the post-innovation market.  For the oligopolists, and indeed for 
other market structures where there is market power, whether a monopolist or a less 
extreme situation of non-price-taking firms, the royalties would not be passed through 
completely to price, as they are in the long-run competitive equilibrium depicted in Figure 
6 with the royalties paid by price-taking nonexclusive licensees.  Appendix A provides a 
discussion of the incomplete pass through of royalties to price. 
As an alternative to using a royalty to provide such a return on the taxpayer’s 
investment, an equity position in the product that the investment makes possible could be 
used, with the equilibrium price that emerges covering the average fixed cost of the normal 
return to the investors.  However, having the government take an equity position in the 
firms to which it grants licenses for federal agencies’ technologies is probably a nonstarter 
in the United States.63  Moreover, the royalties approach is used by investors more 
generally for practical reasons – they want a return on their investment without the need to 
be dependent on the legerdemain of companies’ determination of the residual from gross 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Nonetheless, such policy has been suggested, see for example Mazzacato (2020). 
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profits that will be available to shareholders.  Also, negotiation of royalties has been chosen 
as the appropriate way to provide some return on the taxpayer’s investments in intramural 
research.   
In addition to providing a return to taxpayers to ensure that the opportunity cost of 
their funds is to some extent covered in the price of a product using an invention that public 
funds funded to a substantial extent, the royalties can be used to provide an incentive for 
technology transfer.  The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502) 
mandated the payment of part of a federal agency’s licensing revenues from its patented 
inventions to the inventors, if they were employed by the agency at the time that the 
invention was made.64  Thus, providing the incentives that Congress wanted requires 
negotiating licensing revenues, and royalties and related licensing fees have been used.65 
There are in fact many ways that the existing negotiated royalties, such as the 
millions of dollars in royalties earned for NIH by licensing the technology for the 
paclitaxel-eluting coronary stents, contribute to the technology transfer process and the 
agency’s mission more generally.  As GAO observes66: 
Under federal law and NIH policy, royalty income from license agreements is shared 
between the inventors and the institute or center within NIH in which the technology was 
developed. NIH uses the royalties for multiple purposes that contribute to the technology 
transfer program and the research of its laboratories. Specifically, the royalty payments can 
be used to (1) reward employees of the laboratory, (2) further scientific exchange among 
the laboratories of the agency, (3) educate and train employees of the agency or laboratory, 
(4) support other activities that increase the potential for transfer of the technology of the 
laboratories of the agency, (5) pay expenses incidental to the administration and licensing 
of intellectual property by the agency or laboratory, and (6) support scientific research and 
development consistent with the research and development missions and objectives of the 
laboratory. 
    
Thus, there are many reasons for royalties that are already paid to the government 
for the grant of licenses to use the technologies developed with public funds.  Among those 
reasons, the royalties provide a financial return on the taxpayers’ investments for the R&D 
that generates the technologies.  The financial return ideally covers the opportunity cost of 
the invested funds.  The idea that the price in equilibrium will cover the opportunity cost of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502) amends the Stevenson-Wydler 
Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-480).	  
65 Patenting activity did respond to the incentive, grounded in the market value of the inventions, thereby 
provided to the agency’s inventors.  See Link, et al. (2011).  
66 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), (2003, p. 8). 
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investors’ funds may allay any concern that biomedical companies, anticipating the need to 
pay royalties, would increase initial pricing to compensate for the payment of future 
royalties.  From the perspective of our discussion of the efficiency implications of royalties, 
the royalties should be reflected in price, because ideally price will cover the opportunity 
costs, including the normal return to the investors.   
However, in the context of market failure that would result in too little R&D 
investment by the private sector, policy might not recover the opportunity cost of the public 
funds with a royalty.  Even in such cases, it is important to understand that among their 
many purposes, royalties are returns to investors, public or private, to cover the opportunity 
costs of their funds.  Additionally, here in the circumstances of biomedical R&D, we have 
good reason to believe that in the absence of the royalties, the rivalrous R&D will 
overshoot the socially optimal amount of R&D.   
Moreover, the evidence, that we now develop, suggests that very modest royalty 
fees—amounting to only about 1.2% of Boston Scientific’s sales of the paclitaxel-eluting 
coronary stents or about 1.7% of its gross profits on those sales—were more than sufficient 
to cover the opportunity costs of the public’s funds delivered through the direct-funding 
avenue for Dr. Sollott’s and Dr. Kinsella’s research at NIA.  Even adding royalties to 
provide financial return on the public’s investment through the indirect-funding avenue, the 
rivalrous R&D among the several firms that developed multiple generations of drug-eluting 
stents is unlikely to have been much different from what it was.   
We turn now to a proposal for royalties to address the concerns about high prices, 
but to do so in a different way than price controls.  The royalties that we propose would 
take a different form in each of the two avenues for publicly funding biomedical R&D.   
 
6.2. Government Royalties for the Direct Funding Avenue: Intramural Research 
 
For the federal agencies’ intramural research in the direct funding avenue, any 
royalties for inventions based on the intramural research would be negotiated at the time 
the licenses for using the technology are granted—just as for the drug-eluting stents and 
with the results as shown in Table 3.  The royalties negotiated would be handled just as 
they are now, and the agencies’ offices of technology transfer have procedures for 
managing the royalties process.   
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We thus have an example for the royalties from the direct funding avenue’s 
intramural research.  The royalties would be as they have been for the inventions, such as 
the paclitaxel-eluting coronary stents, originating in the intramural research at NIH.67  For 
the invention of the drug-eluting coronary stents, we have Table 1 with the history for the 
licensing agreements, and then Table 3 illustrating the bottom line for the royalties.  
In 2003, the first year of Boston Scientific’s sales of the paclitaxel-eluting coronary 
stents, when milestone payments would be expected to be a prominent part of the royalties 
and related payments, the Angiotech’s payments to NIH were 3.3% of sales.  After that the 
payments were consistently about 1.2% of sales through 2010, the last year of payments 
before NIH and Angiotech negotiated an end to royalty payments based on the sales of the 
coronary stents.  The royalties and related payments as a percentage of Boston Scientific’s 
sales were 1.3% in 2004, 1.2% in 2005, 1.2% in 2006, 1.2% in 2007, 1.2% in 2008, 1.1% 
in 2009, and 1.1% in 2010. 
Table 7 shows the stream of royalty and milestone payments to NIH in nominal 
dollars and also in constant dollars of 2012, the last year before the expiration of the 
USPTO patents on NIH’s paclitaxel-eluting stent technology.  In 1993, the priority date for 
the original application by NIH for a patent on the invention, when discounted at the 7% 
that OMB mandated as the opportunity cost for the taxpayer’s funds, the present discounted 
value of the stream of royalties in constant dollars of 2012 is $57 million.68  Certainly Dr. 
Sollott and Dr. Kinsella used the accumulated knowledge acquired from many other NIH 
research projects, but those projects’ costs are not a part of the drug-eluting stent research 
project’s cost.  Since that cost would have been far less than $57 million, it would appear 
that the taxpayers earned a return far in excess of the OMB’s estimate of the opportunity 
costs of the public’s funds.69  Stated differently, discounted back at the internal rate of 
return that would make the present discounted value of the stream of royalties equal to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See Ferguson and Kaundina (2014). 
68 In millions, from Table 7, 56.6 = 2.18/(1.07)10 + 21.35/(1.07)11  + 32.37/(1.07)12 + 28.87/(1.07)13 + 
20.22/(1.07)14 + 15.17/(1.07)15 + 10.95/(1.07)16 + 6.13/(1.07)17.  For the 7% discount rate, see U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), 1992. 
69 The project was not a large, costly one, but rather the carrying out of the proof of concept for what turned 
out to be an extraordinarily important insight.  Nijhara, et al. (2005, pp. 3-4) reports that “Taxol, originally 
discovered in the 1960s, and its equivalents are currently the most successful anticancer drugs on the market.  
However, nobody thought of using paclitaxel to prevent arterial re-clogging until, over lunch, NIH inventors 
Steven Sollott, MD, and James Kinsella, MD, brainstormed this very idea. … The experiments were initiated, 
proof of concept was shown in rat models, and a patent application was filed.” 
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cost of the project as of 1993, that internal rate of return would be greater than the 7% 
mandated by OMB as the opportunity cost of the invested funds.  Further, the benefits to 
society as a whole from the innovation of the drug-eluting stent were immensely more than 
the stream of royalty payments to NIH; there are, above and beyond those payments, the 
economic surpluses generated for the producers and the consumers of the technology. 
 
Table 7.  NIH Licensing Revenues from Royalties, Milestones, and Licensing Fees for the 
Paclitaxel-Eluting Coronary Stent 
year Angiotech’s Payments to NIH 
 Nominal $ (millions) Constant 2012 $ (millions)a 
2003 1.8 2.180301 
2004 18.1 21.34938 
2005 28.3 32.37215 
2006 26 28.8676 
2007 18.7 20.21932 
2008 14.3 15.16682 
2009 10.4 10.94696 
2010 5.89 6.128358 
aConstant 2012 dollars using the U.S. GDP implicit price deflator. 
Source: Authors’ construction from Table 3; see notes there. 
 
 
6.3. Government Royalties for the Direct Funding Avenue: Extramural Research 
 
For direct funding that supports extramural research at universities – such as the 
research described in Section 2 for Remdesivir that was funded by NIAID, the royalties 
would be managed by the technology transfer offices of the universities (or other research 
institutions) receiving such direct support.  The universities’ (or other organizations’) 
offices of technology transfer already manage the licensing of the inventions that result 
from the direct public funding support of university research.  When the direct funding 
results in licensing of patented technology, the proposed government royalties would be a 
part of that process of licensing university-generated technology that was supported with 
public funds.   
However, because of the great uncertainty surrounding the extent to which such 
technology will ultimately be successfully commercialized, if it is ever commercialized at 
all, the government’s royalties on the taxpayers’ contribution of the extramural research 
funds would only be triggered for transferred technologies that ultimately achieve 
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sufficiently successful commercialization.  The royalties policy for extramural research 
funding would specify the criterion for sufficiently successful commercialization.  For 
example, it could be as simple as profitability exceeding a stated threshold that could be 
defined in terms of the actual experience of a specified group of top performers for licensed 
extramural research inventions.  The specified group, just for example, could be the top 
25% of those commercialized inventions over the past five years.  The royalties would not 
be tax deductible given their purpose is reimbursement of government funding.  The 
biomedical products paying the royalties would, by design, be among those that are 
successful.  In the unexpected circumstance that a product’s successful commercialization 
ends prior to the expiration of its patent protection (used in the formulation below as the 
endpoint for the royalties), the royalty payments would cease. 
If the royalties were triggered for an invention, the royalties for that direct funding 
support would be based on the amount of support provided, cumulated to its present value, 
at the time of the successful commercialization, using the OMB-mandated opportunity cost 
for the public’s funds, with the cumulated value of the support denoted Ω.  The R&D 
support provided would be capitalized as a publicly funded loan that would be paid back 
over the potential commercial life τ of the licensee’s use of the technology where τ equals 
the number of years remaining for patent protection of the licensed technology at the time 
that the royalty payments begin. With k denoting the public’s opportunity cost of funds 
(discussed in detail subsequently in the exposition of the proposed royalties for the indirect 
funding avenue), the annual debt repayment due in each of the next τ years is d such that
 
Ω = d 1/ (1+ k)t
t=1
τ
∑ .70  When the publicly funded extramural research that supports a 
commercialized biomedical product does not itself result in licensed, patented technology, 
but instead provides R&D support for a private company’s patented product as is the case 
with Gilead’s Remdesivir, the royalties for such products that are deemed sufficiently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The university’s (or other organization’s) technology transfer office would be reimbursed a reasonable 
management fee for its role in administering the new royalties, and policy would specify that HHS would 
receive the royalties to be paid to the government for direct support provided to universities and other 
organizations supported through the first avenue of providing government support for basic research or R&D.  
The Secretary of HHS could be responsible for distributing reimbursements when appropriate as discussed 
subsequently in the exposition of the royalties for the indirect funding avenue.  A portion of the royalties 
could be shared with the university inventors to provide incentive for invention and technology transfer. 
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successful would be paid over the commercial lifetime of the product until the patent for 
the product expires or when its successful commercial lifetime ends, whichever is sooner.  
To ensure the appropriate institutional framework would require some amendments 
to the Bayh-Dole Act (Public Law 96-517 § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019), and the Stevenson-Wydler 
Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311), and its 
amendment, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502, 100 Stat. 
1785).  The federal agencies already have technology transfer offices that manage the 
government’s intellectual property rights in technologies developed with the agencies’ 
intramural research, and universities and other organizations receiving direct publicly-
funded R&D support also have administrative structures for dealing with grants, 
intellectual property, and licensing.  However, while the administrative framework to 
manage the new royalties policies toward extramural research funding is largely in place, 
new resources would be required for the additional responsibilities.   
Essentially, for the royalties proposed here, in addition to the role played by the 
technology transfer offices of the universities, the federal agencies’ technology transfer 
offices, with appropriate increases in resources, would oversee and manage on an on-going 
basis the government and taxpayers’ rights in the biomedical products that ultimately 
emerge from the extramural research that the agencies fund, just as they now do with 
regard to the biomedical products, like the drug-eluting stents, that emerge from the 
agencies’ intramural projects.  Of course, the researchers with extramural support have the 
mindset that they should profit from their discoveries.  The universities and other 
organizations receiving the agencies’ extramural funding could protect the academic 
inventors’ rights, and the agencies could protect the government and taxpayers’ rights in 
whatever deals the universities make with their licensees.  The rights of inventors within 
universities could be protected just as the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 now 
protects the rights of the inventors in the federal laboratories.71  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71For private sector projects such as the SBIR and STTR projects that receive direct public funding through 
the extramural programs of the federal agencies, royalties for licensed technologies developed with the SBIR 
and STTR funding would follow the approach that we have outlined for the licensed inventions emerging 
from universities that have been funded with the federal agencies’ extramural funds.  The new royalties 
would only be triggered when an SBIR or STTR project results in a “sufficiently successful 
commercialization” as discussed above. With an agency’s office of technology transfer and its SBIR program, 
and STTR program if there is one, the administrative framework, when supplied with additional resources to 
handle the increased workload, is available to handle the oversight of the new royalties policy.  The royalties 
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6.4. Government Royalties for the Indirect Funding Avenue 
 
For the indirect funding avenue, the royalty fees would be determined by an 
announced formula that we now develop and illustrate.  First, we explain that when the 
government purchases pharmaceutical and other biomedical products through Medicare, 
Medicaid, the VA, or the Affordable Care Act, there is a sense in which the taxpayers are 
providing to the seller a free loan to finance its R&D.  
To explain the perspective that government purchases are in essence financing 
R&D with a free loan—that is, an outright grant of funds for R&D with no 
reimbursement—we introduce three proportions.  The first is the historical ratio, v, of the 
company’s annual R&D expenses to its net sales.  In particular, from the overall history for 
the company, its average annual R&D expense as a proportion of its net sales is an estimate 
of the proportion, denoted v, of sales used to finance R&D investments.72   
Boston Scientific’s core businesses over the period for our example were all various 
products with medical uses.  By 2012, the core businesses included an endoscopy division 
developing and manufacturing devices to treat a variety of medical conditions including 
diseases of the digestive and pulmonary systems; peripheral interventions products 
including stents, balloon catheters, wires, peripheral embolization devices and other 
devices used to diagnose and treat peripheral vascular disease; a neuromodulation business 
with systems used for the management of chronic pain; a urology/women’s health division 
developing and manufacturing devices to treat various urological and gynecological 
disorders; an electrophysiology business developing less-invasive medical technologies 
used in the diagnosis and treatment of rate and rhythm disorders of the heart; a cardiac 
rhythm management division developing and manufacturing and marketing a variety of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would be triggered only for a small proportion of the population of SBIR projects; only about half of them 
ever commercialize at all (Link and Scott, 2010).  Many of the successful commercialization cases will 
involve licenses granted by the SBIR firm to other firms to use the publicly supported technology developed 
from the project. There is a substantial amount of licensing of technologies developed in the NIH SBIR 
program. Link and Scott (2012, Table 2, p. 379) report that for a random sample of 338 NIH SBIR projects, 
28.1% of the firms receiving the NIH funding to develop new technologies reported finalized licensing 
agreements for the use of the technology developed, and another 22.2% of the firms reported on-going 
negotiations to establish licensing agreements.  
72 Alternatively, an industry standard for the proportion of sales devoted to R&D could be used.  However, 
using the company’s own proportion, will more closely match the royalties to the company’s own expericnce.  
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implantable devices including implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) systems and 
pacemaker systems that monitor the heart and deliver electricity to treat cardiac 
abnormalities; and interventional cardiology products with the coronary stent system sales, 
and in addition to coronary stent systems, balloon catheters, rotational atherectomy 
systems, guide wires, guide catheters, embolic protection devices, and diagnostic catheters 
used in percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) procedures, as well as 
intravascular ultrasound (IVUS) imaging systems.  Over the decade that we observe Boston 
Scientific’s sales of the paclitaxel-eluting coronary stents, its annual R&D expenses as a 
percentage of its net sales averaged 12.1%; thus, v = 0.121.73 
For our discussion, we also use a second proportion, s, of the company’s U.S. sales 
of the particular biomedical product that is purchased by the government.  Table 8 shows 
Boston Scientific’s annual U.S. sales of paclitaxel-eluting coronary stents over the period 
from when the U.S. sales began in 2004 through 2012, the last year before the NIH U.S. 
patents for the stent expired.  Table 8 also shows the estimated portions of the annual sales 
that were paid for by the U.S. government with its purchases for programs such as 
Medicare, Medicaid, the VA, and the Affordable Care Act.  To form the estimates, we use 
assumption that 80% of the stents were used in patients over the age of 65.74  We also use 
the information that 94% and 23% of individuals over and under 65 years of age, 
respectively, are covered by public plans (Berchick, et al., 2019).75  Thus, the portion, s, of 
Boston Scientific’s U.S. sales that were purchased by the government is estimated to be s = 
((0.80 x 0.94) + (0.20 x 0.23)) = 0.798.   
The third proportion, denoted k, used in our discussion will be the annual rate of 
return to cover the opportunity cost of the public’s funds as determined by the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB).  For the period of our example, the OMB 
determination of the opportunity cost of the public’s funds used for investments like the 
R&D in a federal laboratory was an annual real rate of return 0.07 or 7% (U.S. OMB, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The descriptions of its businesses as well as its annual R&D expenses as a percentage of net sales are from 
Boston Scientific’s annual 10K filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  For the ten years 
from 2003 through 2012, the percentages were respectively 13.0, 10.1, 10.8, 12.9, 13.1, 12.5, 12.6, 12.0, 11.7, 
and 12.2. 
74 Auerbach, et al. (2012), Figure 1, “Rate of any cardiac stent procedures by sex and age group.” 
75 Berchick, et al., 2019, Table 2, “Percentage of People by Type of Health Insurance Coverage by Age: 2017 
and 2018,” p. 6.  Over the years that we examine, these numbers change very little, and so we use the one set 
of estimates. 
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1992).  The annual rate of return will be approximated as the OMB-mandated real rate of 
return plus the anticipated rate of inflation. The actual U.S. inflation rate over the period 
from 2004 through 2012 averaged 0.0216 per year.  Thus, with the low rate of inflation, 
and assuming that the anticipated rate of inflation equaled what actually happened 
subsequently, the annual rate of return to cover the opportunity costs of the public funds 
would be well approximated as k = 0.0916.  
Using the three proportions, we now explain the sense in which the taxpayers, with 
their purchases of the biomedical products, are providing a free loan to finance the R&D of 
the company from which the products are purchased.  The product’s annual U.S. sales 
multiplied times the proportion s of the sales purchased by the government gives the 
revenues for the company from the government’s purchases.  Then that amount times the 
proportion v gives the amount of R&D support generated by those sales.  That public 
funding of R&D is essentially a free loan.   
Suppose, for example, that the R&D support provided were capitalized as a publicly 
funded loan that would be paid back over 20 years.  Using the proportion k, for each $1 of 
publicly funded R&D in a given year, the annual debt repayment due in each of the next 20 
years is z such that 1= z 1/ (1+ k)t
1
20
∑ .  With k = 0.0916, z = 0.1108.  In words, a schedule 
of debt repayment that returns to the taxpayers the real annual rate of 7% (a nominal rate of 
9.16%) will return, in each of the next 20 years, $0.1108 or about 11.1 cents for each dollar 
of R&D support provided in a given year.   
The row of Table 8 for “annual debt repayment in each of the next 20 years” shows 
for each year’s R&D supported the amount due in 20 installments to completely repay the 
“loan” from the taxpayers to support R&D in each year.  In the next row of Table 8, for 
“debt repayment due,” we see that because the payments to repay each year’s “loan” extend 
over the next 20 years, as time passes after U.S. sales begin, the yearly debt repayments for 
each year’s loan of R&D funds accumulate.  In the next row, labeled “debt repayment as a 
proportion of U.S. sales,” we see that by 2012, the last year before the patents expire, the 
debt repayments take a large proportion of the U.S. sales.  Moreover, at that point, because 
competition has started to erode the sales, the debt repayments would be particularly 
onerous.  A similar situation would exist for other biomedical products, because patents 
associated with pharmaceuticals and medical products more generally—that is, those not 
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originating with inventions in the federal laboratories—would also typically have a much 
shorter commercialized lifetime than 20 years.  The reason is because the process of 
developing a patented invention to bring it through all the necessary clinical trials and the 
FDA approval process typically takes several of those 20 years of the patent’s life. 
 
Table 8. Boston Scientific Corporation’s U.S. Sales of Paclitaxel-Eluting Coronary 
Stents, the Part of the Sales Paid for with Public Funds, and Hypothetical Debt 
Repayments versus Royalties Paid to the Government 
U.S. nominal $, millions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Boston Scientific’s U. S. sales of paclitaxel-
eluting coronary stentsa 
788 1700 1500 1000 637 411 271 242 149 
Public purchasesb 629 1357 1197 798 508 328 216 193 119 
R&D supportedc  
  
76.1 164 145 96.6 61.5 39.7 26.2 23.4 14.4 
Annual debt repayment in each of the next 20 
years for each year’s R&D supported 
8.43 18.2 16.0 10.7 6.82 4.40 2.90 2.59 1.59 
Debt repayment due 0 8.43 26.6 42.6 53.3 60.2 64.6 67.4 70.0 
Debt repayment as a proportion of U.S. sales 0 0.0050 0.018 0.043 0.084 0.146 0.238 0.279 0.470 
Annual royalty =  
φkvs x (U.S. sales) with φ = 10d 
69.7 150 133 88.4 56.3 36.4 24.0 21.4 13.2 
Annual royalty =  
φkvs x (U.S. sales) with φ =11.424663e 
79.6 172 152 101 64.4 41.5 27.4 24.5 15.1 
a Boston Scientific’s net sales, on which royalty payments in a given year to Angiotech Pharmaceuticals were 
based, are for the period October 1 of the preceding year to September 30 of the given year.   
b As explained in the text, public purchases for a year are estimated as annual sales multiplied by the 
proportion s = 0.798 = ((0.80 x 0.94) + (0.20 x 0.23)). 
c R&D supported = (public purchases) x  (v = 0.121). 
d φ = 10, k = 0.0916, v = 0.121, s = 0.798. 
e φ = 11.424663, k = 0.0916, v = 0.121, s = 0.798. 
Source: Table 3 and authors’ calculations.  
 
 
To avoid the situation of the capitalized debt repayments mounting as the years of 
sales increase, we propose a different approach of paying royalties. The royalties we 
propose would serve as a complete fulfillment of the payment of a return to the taxpayers 
for their support of the company’s R&D by means of the government’s purchases of the 
product.  The approach matches the payments to the taxpayers with the contemporaneous 
ability to pay. 
For the indirect funding avenue, the royalty fees would be determined by an 
announced formula.  The formula is simply that the annual royalty = φkvs x (U.S. sales), 
where φ is a multiplier announced as a part of the proposed royalties policy for indirect 
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funding of R&D through the government’s purchases of the biomedical product.  The next 
to the last row of Table 8 illustrates the royalties to the taxpayers that would have been paid 
by Boston Scientific, using φ = 10, k = 0.0916, v = 0.121, s = 0.798.  Those royalties as a 
proportion of U.S. sales are of course 0.088447 = φkvs in each year.  There would be no 
cumulating debt payments due; the royalties in the stated amount are the full amount of the 
reimbursement to taxpayers for their contribution of R&D support provided indirectly via 
the government’s purchases of the product.  Why would the multiplier equal to 10 be 
sensible? 
The choice for the multiplier φ determines the amount of the opportunity costs of 
the taxpayers’ funds that will be covered by the royalties.  We can see that the choice of φ 
= 10 implies that the royalties cover quite a bit of the opportunity costs.  To see that result, 
consider the following. 
The government’s purchases for a given year are s x (U.S. sales).  The R&D 
supported will be v x s x (U.S. sales), and denote that amount as R.  For a given year of 
sales, that amount R is provided to the company.  That amount for each year is shown in 
Table 8 in the row for “R&D Supported”.  Thinking of that amount R (that has resulted for 
a particular year) as an amount loaned to the company at a time 0, the royalties to be 
received by the taxpayers based on that year’s purchases would be computed as the 
constant amount φkR per unit of time (a year) over one year.  Hence, for any particular 
year, the royalties due would be ϕkRdt
0
1
∫ =ϕkR . 
 If the loan of R is repaid with the annual payment of kR, to completely repay the 
loan for a single year’s R&D support R, the company would have to pay the royalties in 
perpetuity since R = ϕkRe−kt dt
0
T
∫ ⇒ϕ =1 (1− e−kT ) .  Hence as T goes to infinity, the 
multiple φ goes to 1.  Thus, if the multiple φ = 1, the taxpayers would be receiving just one 
year of payment from the perpetual stream of such payments that would be required to 
repay their “loan” to provide R&D support.  However, if the multiple φ = 10, then the 
equation R = ϕkRe−kt dt
0
T
∫  holds when T = 1.15 given that k = 0.0916.  Hence, with the 
multiple φ = 10, the taxpayers receive one payment that covers almost all of their 
opportunity costs.  Covering them all would require another payment for repayments 
accrued over the first 55 days of the next year.   
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The multiple φ that would reduce the number of payment periods T to 1 would be 
11.424663.  The final row of Table 8 shows the royalty payments using that multiple; with 
those payments, the taxpayers are fully reimbursed the opportunity costs of their funds that 
provide R&D support.  Thus, the final row in Table 8 computes the annual royalty 
payments = φkvs x (U.S. sales) for φ = 11.424663, k = 0.0916, v = 0.121, s = 0.798.  Those 
payments as a proportion of U.S. sales are of course 0.10104786.  By comparing the row 
showing the annual R&D supported with the last row showing annual royalties paid with 
the multiplier = 11.424663, one can see that the result is completely intuitive.  In simple 
mathematics solution, the taxpayers would provide the annual amount of R&D based on 
the government’s purchases, and then a year later would be reimbursed that amount with 
the interest compounded continuously that has accrued.  The reality, analogous to the 
treatment of Boston Scientific’s payment of royalties to Angiotech (see the notes for Table 
3), is less precise.76  
Observe that the proposed royalty payments increase with the amount of research 
support provided through the indirect funding avenue, and also observe that the support 
provided increases with the success of the innovation as measured by its sales, and it also 
increases with the price paid by the taxpayers in their role as consumers of the product.  
Thus, it is only the very successful innovations that would be paying a lot in royalties, and 
for such innovations the company could afford to pay the taxpayers’ opportunity cost for 
the R&D support provided to the company.  Observe also, that the R&D supported with the 
indirect public funding would be generating new developments and subsequent sales and 
gross profits that may not be observed in the time series for the particular product for which 
government purchases provided the R&D support.  Finally, observe also that the royalties 
can, given they are not completely passed through to revenues, allow the government to in 
effect pay much lower prices for the innovations that the taxpayers have supported with 
research funds derived from their purchases as consumers of the products; and moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Recall that Angiotech received royalties as of December 31st of the current year for the Boston Scientific 
paclitaxel-eluting stent sales from October 1st of the preceding year through September 30th of the current 
year.   
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any escalation in the prices of the products would result in an escalation in the royalties 
returned to the taxpayers.77 
 We have chosen the value for the multiplier φ that resulted in the full 
reimbursement of the taxpayers’ opportunity cost; however, that need not be the choice 
preferred by policy.  Legislated policy would determine with public debate and formal 
legislation a fair and equitable choice for φ.  The policy would not choose φ directly, but 
rather indirectly.  The policy would stipulate that taxpayers would receive only the one 
royalty payment φkR for each year’s amount of R&D generated by the government’s 
purchases for that year.  That amount of R&D depends on the U.S. sales, the proportion s, 
and the proportion v.  Then the one royalty payment for the year’s amount of R&D 
provided would be φkR = φkvs x (U.S. sales).  The legislated policy would determine how 
many years of that royalty payment would be required to completely repay the taxpayers 
the opportunity cost for their funds to support that year’s R&D expenditures.  They will get 
only one payment, and that one payment will repay their opportunity cost completely if the 
multiple φ that would reduce the number of payment periods T to 1 is used.   
We have chosen the multiple that reduces T to 1 to determine the royalty payments 
in the last row of Table 8, but it need not be the choice.  Presently, with no such royalties 
policy, the implicit choice is for a multiplier of 0, and hence no royalty payment at all.  If 
the choice were for the taxpayers to receive one payment of the perpetual stream that would 
be required to repay their opportunity cost, the multiplier would be 1, and at the other 
extreme, if the choice were that they be fully repaid with the one royalty payment, then, 
given k = 0.0916, the choice would imply that φ = 11.424663.  
The legislated choice for the number of periods of the single royalty payment that 
would be required if the taxpayers were to be fully repaid for their R&D support (a choice 
that will implicitly determine the multiplier φ given k) should be adjusted based on the type 
of biomedical product.  For example, special allowance—that is, lower royalty rates—to 
foster research would be made for orphan drugs and biomedical products for rare diseases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The policy could specify that the royalties would be paid to HHS.  For purchases paid by the government 
through Medicare or other government insurance programs, policy need not specify a procedure for 
transferring the royalties to the consumers.  The taxpayers paid the high prices via the government’s 
purchases, and the government received some reimbursement via the royalty payments, in effect reducing the 
prices paid.  If the policy is designed to address high prices paid by consumers whose purchases were not 
paid by the government, the Secretary of HHS could be responsible for distributing reimbursements 
proportionately to those consumers. 
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more generally, for some vaccines where the context of their use would not allow sufficient 
revenues to cover the costs of developing, producing, and marketing, and for other 
exceptional cases as appropriate. 
Why would royalties be better than price controls?  With price controls, biomedical 
companies would anticipate an arbitrary and uncertain revenue reduction to be imposed 
after a product succeeds.  In contrast, the royalties to be imposed are known, as a 
percentage of whatever sales result, before the development of the product.  Further, as a 
proportion of the sales, the absolute amount increases, in a way known prior to the 
development, with the success of the commercialization and the ability to pay the royalties.  
Just as for private investors, the taxpayers in their role as the public investors obtain a 
return that is increasing in the success of the project.78  A result is that when the market 
price of the product turns out to be high, the royalties paid to the government are higher 
and hence the funds to offset the high prices are greater. 
It is important to note that the royalties that we propose do not constitute an equity 
position for the government.  The government is not a residual claimant to the profits of the 
biomedical firms that will pay the royalties—just as NIH had no equity position in 
Angiotech, but instead received a royalty based on sales as specified in the licensing 
agreement of November 19, 1997. 
We have set out the broad outline of a policy of royalties as a financial return on the 
taxpayers’ investments in biomedical products that are developed with substantial amounts 
of public funding.  The proposed royalties provide funds that the government could use 
directly to offset high prices paid for pharmaceuticals and other biomedical products.  
However, such a royalties policy would not preclude the possibility that additionally, as 
contemplated by Congress in the legislative proposals in 2019, the Secretary of HHS would 
be granted through new legislation the right to negotiate the drug prices to be paid by 
Medicare and Medicaid.  If the legislation supporting negotiations for lower prices were 
enacted, our broad royalties proposal would provide information that could be helpful for 
the price negotiations, and negotiations could offset any pass through of royalties to higher 
prices.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Also, successful projects’ increased volume will typically be accompanied by decreased average total cost, 
and profits may be especially high even as royalties increase. 
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With the information available from the royalties policy, any legislated bargaining 
right granted would be supported by the information about the amount of R&D funding 
directly or indirectly provided for the drugs being purchased.  Any price negotiations could 
be grounded in clear, publicized knowledge of the amount of funding for the drug, or 
biomedical product more generally, that the government had provided, because such 
information would be readily available as it was gathered for the purpose of determining 
royalties on the government’s investments through each of the two avenues for delivering 
biomedical funding.    
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
In the macroeconomic literature about the relationship between R&D investment 
and economic growth as it is observed across different countries, there is thoughtful 
commentary about how intellectual property regimes that are too strict can inhibit the 
ability of R&D investment to drive economic growth.79  In the history of the technology 
transfer of the invention of the drug-eluting coronary stent, we have an example where the 
set of international patents protecting the intellectual property of the invention allowed 
successful commercialization of the product.80  The patent protection however did not 
prevent the entry of new firms with their competing patented versions of the drug-eluting 
coronary stent.  The rivalrous R&D investment of pharmaceutical and medical device 
companies competing in worldwide markets was vigorous, and a new generation of drug-
eluting coronary stents was developed.  Rivalrous R&D generated improvements to the 
technology that benefited the millions of patients treated with interventional cardiology.  
Effective patents, within IP regimes that avoid overly restrictive patents, are desirable. 
There is also much thoughtful commentary in the policy literature about how price 
controls for pharmaceutical or other biomedical products would inhibit R&D investment.81  
However, the evidence that we have developed for the technology transfer of the drug-
eluting coronary stent is consistent with Scherer’s (2010) description of pharmaceutical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See, for example, van Stel, et al. (2019). 
80 Leech and Scott (2020) provide a history of the foreign patent litigation for the paclitaxel-eluting coronary 
stent, and they also provide general econometric evidence, over time and across U.S. federal agencies, about 
the importance of foreign patent protection for successful transfer of technologies invented in the laboratories 
of U.S. federal agencies. 
81 See, for example, Kennedy (2019). 
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R&D as virtuous rent-seeking R&D that can actually overshoot the socially optimal 
amount of R&D.  Moreover, because we observe the rivalrous pharmaceutical and medical 
device companies developing their own versions of pioneering products, just as happened 
with the drug-eluting coronary stent with FDA PMAs growing even during a period when 
the overall market was contracting, it is possible, and perhaps likely, that imposition of 
price controls might result in R&D investment closer to the social optimum.  Nonetheless, 
expectation of price controls might well introduce sufficient uncertainty, about the amount 
of the expected reduction in appropriated returns, to reduce R&D investment below 
desirable levels.  As an alternative policy, the royalties policy proposed would create less 
uncertainty and yet provide a way to mitigate the problem of taxpayers paying what are 
perceived to be unreasonable prices for the very products that their tax dollars supported 
with funds for R&D. 
The pricing for Remdesivir was announced on June 29, 2020, in an open letter from 
Gilead Sciences.  For VA and DoD, the price will be $2,340 per patient for a typical five-
day treatment course.  Medicare and Medicaid will not get that discounted price, but 
instead the price for a five-day treatment will be $3,120 per patient.82  Considerable effort 
is put into thoughtful analysis of biomedical prices and their reasonableness.83  With the 
policy we propose, whether one finds the prices reasonable or not, the taxpayers would be 
reimbursed some of the opportunity costs of the R&D investment funds that they provided 
through direct funding for academic research that supported the commercialization, and 
also that they would be providing indirectly to Gilead with the purchases of the drug. 
Finkelstein and Temin (2008, p. 113) explain that the price of drugs needs to cover 
the cost of failed efforts to develop other drugs.84  The gross profits for a biomedical 
company must cover many costs, R&D among them, and the point is that the R&D costs to 
be covered are considerably more than just those for the successful biomedical product.  
That is another reason why a royalties policy is preferable to price controls.  With the 
royalties, as formulated in our proposal, price is left to find its level as determined in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Howard and Thomas (2020). 
83 See, for example, Whittington and Campbell (2020). 
84	  Finkelstein	  and	  Temin	  (2008,	  chapter	  7,	  “How	  to	  Lower	  Drug	  Prices”)	  propose	  divorcement	  of	  
pharmaceutical	  companies’	  drug	  development	  operations	  from	  their	  marketing	  and	  distribution	  
operations,	  and	  propose	  an	  independent,	  public,	  nonprofit	  organization	  that	  would	  license	  FDA-­‐
approved	  drugs	  developed	  by	  the	  drug	  developers,	  and	  then	  auction	  the	  distribution	  rights	  to	  the	  firms	  
that	  would	  sell	  the	  drugs.	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(very complex) market, and part of that level has to do with prices needing to cover the 
costs of failed development efforts.  But, whatever the price and extent it reflects royalties, 
the taxpayers are getting a piece of it with the royalties policy that we have proposed, and 
the policy is designed so that royalty payments coincide with the company’s ability to pay 
them.  With post-innovation oligopolistic rivalry among substitutable products, as well as 
with other market structures (other than the simple case of nonexclusive licenses and pure 
competition depicted in Figure 6), pass-through is incomplete, and surplus is redistributed 
to taxpayers. 
The policy for royalties that we have proposed would certainly require new 
legislation, just as would the many proposals for price controls that have recently been 
considered by the U.S. Congress.  We have suggested the royalties as an alternative or 
complement to price controls; the royalties could mitigate high prices, while they would 
create less uncertainty, and therefore would be less likely to cause an undesirable reduction 
in R&D investment.  However, the process of determining the royalties would generate 
information that could be used as the basis for price negotiations, and for that reason the 
policy of royalties could be a complement to the new policies that are being proposed for 
negotiation of pharmaceutical prices.  There is also the possibility, however faint it may be 
in the fractious policy environment of the day, that the policies of royalties and negotiated 
prices could be accomplished with voluntary cooperative agreements among the parties 
involved—especially in the light of the information that would be developed, for the 
royalties policy, about the amounts of public funding devoted to support R&D for 
biomedical products.   
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Appendix	  A.	  	  Incomplete	  Pass	  Through	  of	  the	  Royalty	  to	  Price	  Given	  Market	  
Power	  
As	  observed	  in	  Section	  6.1	  of	  the	  study,	  a	  royalty	  is	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  
completely	  passed	  through	  to	  price	  when	  the	  producer	  has	  market	  power.	  	  This	  
appendix	  discusses	  that	  expectation.	  
To	  describe	  the	  incomplete	  pass	  through	  to	  price	  of	  the	  royalty	  per	  unit	  sold,	  
consider	  the	  following	  general	  observations.	  	  A	  simple	  monopolist,	  and	  more	  
generally	  a	  firm	  with	  market	  power,	  faces	  a	  downward	  sloping	  demand	  curve	  from	  
which	  to	  choose	  a	  profit-­‐maximizing	  price	  where	  marginal	  revenue	  (MR)	  equals	  
marginal	  cost	  (MC).	  	  If	  the	  royalty	  is	  imposed,	  MC	  increases	  and	  a	  new	  equilibrium	  is	  
found	  where	  MR	  =	  MC.	  	  First,	  the	  increase	  in	  MC	  from	  the	  initial	  equilibrium	  of	  MR	  =	  
MC	  without	  royalties	  to	  the	  new	  equilibrium	  is	  less	  than	  the	  royalty	  per	  unit	  because	  
MR	  has	  a	  negative	  slope	  and	  MC	  has	  a	  positive	  slope;	  or	  if	  MC	  is	  constant,	  the	  increase	  
in	  MC	  in	  the	  new	  equilibrium	  equals	  the	  royalty	  per	  unit.	  	  Second,	  the	  increase	  in	  price	  
from	  the	  initial	  equilibrium	  where	  MR	  =	  MC	  to	  the	  new	  equilibrium	  is	  less	  than	  the	  
increase	  in	  MC	  from	  the	  first	  to	  the	  second	  equilibrium,	  because	  the	  MR	  curve	  is	  
steeper	  than	  the	  demand	  curve	  (i.e.,	  its	  negative	  slope	  has	  a	  larger	  absolute	  value	  than	  
the	  negative	  slope	  of	  the	  demand	  curve).	  
Figure	  A.1	  illustrates	  the	  incomplete	  pass	  through	  of	  the	  royalty	  to	  price	  for	  a	  
monopolist	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  straight-­‐line	  demand	  curve	  (D)	  and	  constant	  unit	  costs.	  	  
The	  monopolist	  faces	  a	  linear	  downward-­‐sloping	  demand	  for	  its	  product.	  	  The	  
marginal	  cost	  (MC)	  is	  constant.	  	  If	  a	  royalty	  of	   r 	  per	  unit	  is	  imposed,	  the	  price	  set	  by	  
the	  monopolist	  will	  rise	  by	   r / 2 	  because	  the	  MR	  curve	  is	  twice	  as	  steep	  as	  the	  demand	  
curve	  and	  therefore	  the	  amount	  measured	  by	  line	  segment	   SU equals	  one-­‐half	  of	  the	  
amount	  measured	  by	  line	  segment	   ZY .	  	  	  
Algebraically,	  let	  the	  inverse	  demand	  curve	  beP = d -eQ ,	  where denotes	  
price,	  and denotes	  output.	  	  Total	  revenue	  isPQ= dQ -eQ2 ,	  andMR= d -2eQ .	  	  
Initially,	  MR	  =	  MC	  impliesQ= (d -MC) / 2e ,	  and	  thenP = d -e(d -MC) / 2e= (d+MC) / 2 .	  	  If	  
the	  royalty	  is	  imposed,	  at	  the	  new	  profit-­‐maximizing	  equilibrium,	  
P
Q
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MR= d -2eQ=MC+r ,	  andQ= (d -(MC+r)) / 2e .	  	  The	  new	  price	  is	   (d+MC+r) / 2 and	  
exceeds	  the	  original	  price	  by r / 2 .	  	  	  
	  
Figure A.1.  Incomplete pass through with monopoly with straight-line demand and 
constant unit cost 
	  
Source: Authors’ construction. 
	  
Consumers,	  with	  the	  government	  as	  their	  agent,	  collect	  the	  area	  AZYB	  in	  
royalties,	  a	  transfer	  out	  of	  what	  was	  producer	  surplus	  without	  the	  royalties.	  	  As	  
explained	  in	  Section	  6.1,	  the	  payment	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  
consumers’	  opportunity	  cost	  for	  their	  funds	  provided	  for	  R&D	  in	  their	  role	  as	  
investors.	  	  For	  the	  quantity	  that	  they	  buy	  in	  the	  new	  equilibrium,	  the	  consumers	  pay	  
more,	  by	  the	  amount	  given	  by	  the	  rectangle	  with	  vertices	  P	  +	  r/2,	  S,	  U,	  and	  P,	  than	  was	  
the	  case	  without	  the	  royalty.	  	  But	  the	  royalties	  received	  are	  greater	  (the	  area	  AZYB	  is	  
twice	  as	  large	  as	  the	  area	  from	  P	  +	  r/2	  to	  S	  to	  U	  to	  P,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  net	  gain	  for	  
consumers	  that	  exceeds	  the	  area	  of	  the	  small	  triangle	  STU	  of	  lost	  consumer	  surplus	  
because	  of	  the	  reduction	  in	  output.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  monopolist’s	  net	  loss	  in	  
producer	  surplus	  because	  it	  loses	  the	  rectangle	  AZYB	  (transferred	  to	  consumers)	  and	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gains	  back	  only	  half	  that	  amount	  with	  the	  rectangle	  from	  P	  +	  r/2	  to	  S	  to	  U	  to	  P,	  the	  
producer	  loses	  producer	  surplus	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  area	  of	  the	  two	  rectangles	  UTVZ	  
and	  ZVXY,	  but	  the	  lower	  of	  those	  two	  rectangles	  is	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  
consumers’	  invested	  funds	  that,	  without	  the	  royalties	  policy,	  is	  transferred	  to	  the	  
producer.	  	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  body	  of	  the	  study,	  a	  policy	  of	  price	  control	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
complement	  to	  a	  policy	  of	  royalties.	  	  If	  the	  royalties	  policy	  is	  combined	  with	  a	  policy	  of	  
negotiated	  prices,	  the	  transfer	  of	  surplus	  from	  the	  producer	  to	  the	  consumers	  can	  be	  
effected	  without	  any	  loss	  of	  total	  surplus.	  	  A	  negotiated	  price	  of	  P,	  the	  original	  price	  
without	  the	  royalty,	  changes	  the	  demand	  curve	  to	  a	  horizontal	  line	  from	  P	  to	  the	  
original	  demand	  curve,	  and	  then	  from	  that	  point	  follows	  the	  original	  demand	  curve.	  	  
The	  producer’s	  MR	  is	  then	  the	  horizontal	  line	  from	  P	  to	  the	  demand	  curve	  and	  then	  at	  
that	  point	  drops	  discontinuously	  to	  the	  original	  MR	  curve.	  	  With	  the	  negotiated	  price	  
and	  the	  royalty,	  the	  equilibrium	  price	  and	  output	  would	  then	  be	  the	  same	  as	  without	  
the	  royalty,	  but	  consumers	  would	  collect	  royalties	  equal	  to	  the	  sum	  of	  AZYB	  and	  ZVXY	  
to	  cover	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  their	  invested	  funds.	  	  The	  royalties	  are	  
transferred	  to	  the	  consumers	  from	  what	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  producer	  
surplus.	  	  Observe	  that	  the	  price	  control	  could	  theoretically	  be	  set	  at	  an	  epsilon	  above	  
MC	  +	  r	  and	  eliminate	  essentially	  all	  of	  the	  deadweight	  loss	  in	  the	  post-­‐innovation	  
market	  for	  the	  innovative	  product.	  	  However,	  such	  a	  price	  along	  with	  the	  royalties	  
would	  eliminate	  essentially	  all	  earnings	  above	  the	  post-­‐innovation	  costs,	  and	  those	  
earnings	  are	  a	  necessary	  incentive	  to	  get	  the	  innovation	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
Observe	  that	  with	  upward	  sloping	  marginal	  cost,	  the	  pass	  through	  of	  the	  
royalty	  to	  price	  is	  even	  less	  than	  is	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  A.1.	  	  Also,	  observe	  that	  the	  
reality	  of	  the	  post-­‐innovation	  market	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  few	  firms	  that	  offer	  somewhat	  
substitutable	  products.	  	  Those	  firms	  in	  the	  post-­‐innovation	  market	  sell	  differentiated	  
products,	  and	  each	  firm	  has	  market	  power—i.e.,	  it	  faces	  a	  downward	  sloping	  demand	  
curve.	  	  Thus,	  the	  situation	  for	  each	  firm	  could	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  the	  
same	  as	  what	  is	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  A.1,	  with	  each	  firm	  facing	  a	  downward	  sloping	  
demand	  curve,	  for	  the	  part	  of	  the	  market	  it	  serves	  given	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  other	  
firms	  and	  their	  choices,	  and	  choosing	  its	  price	  independently	  of	  the	  others.	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The	  situation	  in	  the	  post-­‐innovation	  market	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  evolving	  and	  
typically	  quite	  dynamic,	  and	  so	  a	  simple	  Nash	  noncooperative	  equilibrium	  is	  probably	  
unlikely	  to	  obtain.	  	  Yet,	  if	  it	  did,	  we	  can	  also	  see	  the	  incomplete	  pass	  through	  of	  the	  
royalty	  to	  price.	  	  To	  illustrate,	  consider	  the	  simplest	  case	  where	  instead	  of	  
differentiated	  products,	  the	  firms	  sell	  a	  homogenous	  product	  and	  have	  the	  same	  
constant	  unit	  cost	  as	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  A.1.	  	  By	  exploring	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  in	  this	  
simple	  context,	  we	  can	  learn	  about	  the	  pass	  through	  of	  the	  royalty	  in	  Nash	  
equilibrium,	  while	  having	  just	  a	  single	  price	  to	  keep	  track	  of,	  instead	  of	  having	  a	  
different	  price	  for	  each	  of	  the	  competitors,	  as	  would	  in	  general	  be	  the	  case	  with	  
competitors	  with	  differentiated	  goods.	  
To	  develop	  the	  example,	  we	  begin	  with	  the	  same	  inverse	  demand	  curve	  for	  the	  
market:	  P = d -eQ .	  	  For	  the	  example,	  there	  are	  n	  symmetric	  quantity-­‐setting	  firms	  in	  
Nash	  equilibrium.	  	  Given	  the	  market	  demand,	  and	  given	  the	  output	  of	  its	  rivals,	  the	  ith	  
firm’s	  inverse	  demand	  curve,	  with	  qj	  denoting	  the	  output	  of	  the	  jth	  rival,	  is	  
P = d -e( qjj≠i∑ +qi)= (d -e qjj≠i∑ )-eqi .	  
In	  Nash	  equilibrium,	  maximizing	  its	  profits	  given	  the	  output	  of	  its	  rivals,	  the	  ith	  
firm	  chooses	  to	  produce	  such	  that	  its	  marginal	  revenue	  equals	  its	  marginal	  cost:	  
MRi = (d -e qj )j≠i∑ -2eqi =MC .	  
With	  symmetry	  (i.e.,	  the	  firms	  sell	  homogeneous	  products	  and	  have	  the	  same	  
costs),	  in	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium,	  each	  firm	  produces	  the	  same	  amount	  qi	  =	  qj	  =	  q*.	  	  The	  
quantity	  for	  each	  firm	  that	  solves	  the	  n	  identical	  equations	  (one	  for	  each	  firm	  choosing	  
its	  output	  where	  its	  marginal	  revenue	  equals	  its	  marginal	  cost)	  will	  be	  the	  same	  for	  all	  
of	  the	  firms	  in	  the	  equilibrium.	  	  Thus,	  in	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  without	  the	  royalty,	  
with	  each	  firm	  making	  its	  best	  response	  to	  the	  others,	  for	  each	  firm:	  
MRi = (d -(n -1)eq*)-2eq*=MC⇒ q*= (1/ (n+1))((d -MC) / e) .	  
The	  market	  output	  is:	  nq*= (n / (n+1))((d -MC) / e) .	  
Price	  is:	  P = d -e(n / (n+1))((d -MC) / e)= (d+nMC) / (n+1) .	  
With	  the	  royalty,	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  price	  is:	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Pr = d -e(n / (n+1))((d -(MC+r)) / e)= (d+n(MC+r)) / (n+1) .	  
Thus,	  with	  the	  royalty,	  the	  price	  exceeds	  the	  original	  price	  by	   (n / (n+1))r .	  	  
Observe	  that	  when	  n	  =	  1,	  we	  have	  the	  same	  result	  as	  for	  monopoly—half	  of	  the	  
royalty	  is	  passed	  through	  to	  price.	  	  With	  two	  firms	  in	  symmetric	  Nash	  equilibrium,	  
two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  royalty	  is	  passed	  through	  to	  price.	  	  With	  three	  firms	  in	  symmetric	  
Nash	  equilibrium,	  three-­‐fourths	  of	  the	  royalty	  is	  passed	  through	  to	  price,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
With	  a	  large	  number	  of	  firms	  competing	  with	  the	  same	  product	  in	  the	  post-­‐innovation	  
market,	  the	  output	  and	  price	  approach	  the	  competitive	  output	  and	  price	  where,	  as	  we	  
saw	  in	  Section	  6.1,	  the	  royalty	  is	  completely	  passed	  through	  to	  price.	  	  	  
However,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  competing,	  substitutable,	  innovative	  products	  is	  
not	  expected	  in	  the	  post-­‐innovation	  market.	  	  Moreover,	  even	  with	  the	  smaller	  number	  
of	  firms	  for	  which	  Nash	  equilibrium	  can	  be	  a	  sensible	  expectation,	  remember	  that	  the	  
results	  here	  are	  for	  the	  simple	  straight-­‐line	  demand	  and	  constant	  cost	  case.	  	  For	  any	  n,	  
pass	  through	  is	  less	  with	  rising	  marginal	  costs.	  	  Also	  remember	  that	  the	  expectation	  
for	  the	  post-­‐innovation	  market	  is	  not	  only	  for	  a	  few	  firms	  with	  differentiated	  
products,	  but	  those	  few	  firms	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  choosing	  their	  outputs	  and	  prices	  in	  
a	  dynamic,	  rapidly	  evolving	  market	  where	  the	  static	  Nash	  equilibrium	  is	  not	  expected	  
to	  obtain.	  	  Thus,	  the	  simple	  story	  for	  a	  firm	  with	  market	  power	  that	  is	  depicted	  in	  
Figure	  A.1	  is	  what	  is	  expected.	  	  The	  most	  likely	  situation	  in	  the	  dynamic	  context	  would	  
then	  be	  analogous	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  “monopolistic	  competition”	  model	  but	  with	  just	  a	  
few	  firms	  selling	  differentiated	  products,	  and	  with	  the	  market	  evolving	  rapidly	  and	  
precluding	  entry	  of	  sufficient	  competitors	  to	  establish	  the	  textbook	  zero	  profit	  
equilibrium	  for	  the	  market.	  
Importantly,	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  Figure	  A.1,	  a	  policy	  of	  price	  
negotiations	  complements	  the	  policy	  of	  royalties,	  because	  the	  transfer	  of	  producer	  
surplus	  to	  the	  consumers	  to	  repay	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  their	  invested	  funds	  can	  be	  
accomplished	  without	  the	  loss	  of	  any	  of	  the	  total	  surplus.	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